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Due Process, Delegation, and Private Veto Power
B. Jessie Hill1
Abstract
Nondelegation doctrine is enjoying a scholarly revival. Some commentators have read the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2019 decision in Gundy v. United States to portend new limitations on Congress’s ability to give away its authority
to the executive branch. A recent decision involving Amtrak’s entitlement to exercise regulatory authority raised similar
questions about delegation to private entities. Together, these cases may suggest imminent new constraints on the
administrative state, generating urgent reconsideration of the purpose and application of the nondelegation doctrine.
This Article is focused on one particular line of nondelegation cases that has received less attention in the
nondelegation debate: those involving private vetoes. The private-veto doctrine holds that the government cannot, consistent
with the Due Process Clause, grant standardless control to private individuals or entities over the property or liberty of
others. Rather than waxing and waning like other forms of nondelegation, the private-veto doctrine has retained vitality
for over a century. In fact, it is woven into a variety of constitutional doctrines, and it helps to explain cases like Larkin
v. Grendel’s Den and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, which embody the principle that due process
is infringed when the government enables private individuals to exercise sovereignty over others based on illicit motives.
Yet, joining the private-veto doctrine with other nondelegation doctrines has resulted in courts and scholars both
misunderstanding what is unique and important about this line of cases and failing to analyze legal questions properly.
This particular delegation doctrine is primarily concerned not with separation of powers, but with arbitrary uses of power,
including those motivated by pecuniary bias and by personal prejudices against unpopular groups. Thus, in addition to
urging a more clear-eyed reconsideration of the private-veto doctrine, this Article suggests that the doctrine may be relevant
to current constitutional controversies in ways that have not be previously recognized. In particular, it may provide a
stronger basis for litigating certain kinds of abortion restrictions, as well as a new route for challenging statutes that
empower religious individuals to deprive third parties of access to contraception and other forms of health care.

Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. Many thanks to Jonathan Adler, Jonathan Entin, Alex Tseis, and Evan Zoldan for
extremely useful comments and suggestions. An early version of this paper was presented at the Loyola University
Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium in November 2020. Many thanks to the participants in that colloquium who
also provided helpful, constructive feedback. All errors are mine.
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Due Process, Delegation, and Private Veto Power
Introduction
The Due Process Clause2 forbids the government to grant standardless, unreviewable control
to private individuals or entities over the property or liberty of others. This proposition has long been
an uncontroversial one in constitutional law. Indeed, it is self-evidently inconsistent with fundamental
fairness, individual liberty, and equal citizenship to allow some private individuals to exercise
sovereignty over other private individuals, empowering them to make decisions about another
person’s financial or fundamental personal interests, based on personal motives. Yet, this basic axiom
of constitutional law—often referred to as a principle of “private nondelegation”—has become
doctrinally entangled with other forms of delegation and, as a result, has seemingly lost it
distinctiveness.3
This due-process principle is both longstanding and deeply entrenched. In the 1912 case
Eubank v. City of Richmond,4 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that allowed twothirds of property owners on a street to demand a particular setback for future building, noting that it
allowed one set of private individuals to exert control over another’s property without any legal
constraints on their exercise of discretion.5 More recently, this principle has been used to strike down
occupational licensing schemes that make the ability to do business depend on the discretion of a
private parties.6 But the principle that the government cannot enable arbitrary exercises of coercive
authority by private individuals can be identified in a wide swath of constitutional cases, from Larkin
v. Grendel’s Den,7 striking down a delegation of authority over a bar’s liquor license to a nearby church,
to Palmore v. Sidoti, 8 holding that the racial prejudices of unrelated individuals may not dictate a child
custody decision. This principle has an affiliation, too, to cases striking down standardless delegations
of authority to public officials, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,9 which invalidated the use of administrative
licensing discretion to discriminate against Chinese laundry operators, and Freedman v. Maryland,10
which struck down a state film licensing scheme lacking in standards and procedural safeguards.
Finally, this Article argues that current controversies over some abortion clinic licensing
regulations and over statutes granting exemptions to religious individuals from generally applicable
U.S. CONST. amdt. V (“No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”);
U.S. CONST. amdt. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law….”).
3 Jacqueline Y. Ma, “Undue” Delegation: Private Delegation and Other Strategies to Challenge Admitting-Privileges Laws, 30 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 549, 576 (2016) (noting that the due-process and delegation doctrines have become “muddled); cf. Paul
J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 354-55 (2016) (situating this doctrine within a lost
history derived from the Magna Carta’s prohibition against arbitrary laws).
4 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
5 Id. at 143-44.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 43-64.
7 495 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Mass. 1980), aff’d, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1981), aff'd 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
8 466 U.S. 429 (1984). As explained in Part I.A. 4., no actual private party exercised a veto over the child custody
decision in Palmore. Instead, the family court judge in Palmore based the custody decision on the potential hostility of
unidentified third parties who were not involved in the case. But Palmore is discussed in this Article as a manifestation of
the broader, bedrock constitutional principle that individuals’ fundamental liberty and property interests may not be
legally subordinate to the irrational prejudices of others.
9 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
10 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see id. at 57 (“[T]he Maryland statute lacks sufficient safeguards for confining the censor's action to
judicially determined constitutional limits, and therefore contains the same vice as a statute delegating excessive
administrative discretion.”)
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laws may also involve improper delegation of private veto power over third parties’ rights. Arguably,
the private-veto doctrine better captures the harm that occurs when religious hospitals are empowered
to shut down abortion clinics and when religious individuals are given the power to deny others access
to contraception than the legal theories that are currently applied to such cases. The private-veto
doctrine is thus an under-explored avenue for challenging those laws, as well as an under-recognized
aspect of Due Process doctrine that is nonetheless fundamental to the concept of the rule of law.
Because laws that convey this sort of authority to private parties involve a delegation of
governmental authority, courts and commentators often lump this doctrine together analytically with
other forms of “delegation.”11 In particular, the due process private-delegation doctrine is often treated
as a subsest of the doctrine forbidding delegation of legislative power outside the legislative branch.
That doctrine, long considered a dead letter, is now experiencing a renaissance of scholarly attention
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gundy v. United States.12 In Gundy, the Court upheld
a federal law against a challenge that it impermissibly delegated legislative authority to the executive
branch, but the conservative justices all indicated a willingness to consider reviving that long-dormant
doctrine.13 And in fact, both kinds of nondelegation doctrines share similar characteristics and at times
advance similar interests. For example, both doctrines, insofar as they address delegations of legal
authority to private actors, are at least partially concerned about the possibility of self-dealing by the
private actor, who has an incentive to exercise that authority for her own financial gain.14
This Article argues, however, that joining this particular due-process doctrine with other
delegation doctrines has resulted in courts and scholars both misunderstanding what is unique and
important about this line of cases and failing to analyze legal questions properly. The due process
doctrine forbidding private control over others’ liberty or property interests—what I will refer to in
this Article as the “private-veto doctrine”—is concerned primarily with arbitrary uses of power,
including those motivated not only by pecuniary bias but also by prejudices against unpopular
groups—over legally recognized property or liberty interests. As such, it implicates both procedural
and substantive due process and may be analyzed separately under each framework.
See, e.g., Jacqueline Y. Ma, "Undue" Delegation: Private Delegation and Other Strategies to Challenge Admitting-Privileges Laws,
30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 549, 576 (2016) (“Courts have tackled the problem of improper delegation through two
doctrines: non-delegation and due process. Frequently these two analyses become muddled.”); Benjamin Silver,
Nondelegation in the States, 75 Vand. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2022) (describing private nondelegation as simply one branch
of nondelegation doctrine); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and
Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 977-78 (2014) (demonstrating how courts confuse the due-process
doctrine with other delegation doctrines grounded primarily in separation-of-powers concerns and arguing that they
should be kept analytically distinct).
12139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). Delegation doctrine is all the rage these days. For a sampling of post-Gundy scholarship on the
delegation doctrine, see, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931
(2020); Richard A. Epstein, Delegation of Powers: A Historical and Functional Analysis, 24 CHAP. L. REV. 659 (2021); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., The Private Delegation Doctrine, 73 FLA. L. REV. 31 (2021); Gary Lawson, "I'm Leavin' It (All) Up to You": Gundy
and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2018-2019, AT 31; Julian Davis Mortenson &
Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (2021).
13 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (stating that the challenged delegation “falls well within permissible bounds”); id. at 2131
(Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84
years, I would support that effort.”); id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (urging immediate reconsideration of the Court’s lax
approach to delegation). Justice Kavanaugh, who was not on the Court when Gundy was argued and therefore did not
participate in the decision, also has expressed sympathy for reviving the nondelegation doctrine. See Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that the
nondelegation doctrine “may warrant further consideration in future cases”).
14 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Evan C. Zoldan, Delegation to Nonexperts, 169 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 100, 109 (2020); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 659 (1986).
11
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The siren song of nondelegation doctrine has also led courts and commentators to largely ask
the wrong set, or at least an incomplete set, of questions in private-veto cases. There is good reason
to consdier, as some scholars have, whether the delegate is a private or public entity, since this inquiry
will determine whether particular constitutional protections apply, and against whom.15 In addition, as
they have been doing, courts may have reason to ask what kind of power is being delegated—legislative
or adjudicative—because the nature of the power exercised by the private delegate determines whether
procedural due process protections apply.16 But commentators have largely failed to ask an equally
important question: Over what is the power is being exercised? In order to invoke review under the
Due Process Clause in its procedural dimension, a delegation usually must affect an individual’s
protected, fundamental interest in life, liberty, or property. Similarly, heightened scrutiny applies under
the substantive due process doctrines to arbitrary deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or
property interests. Yet most analyses of the private-veto doctrine have missed this crucial point, often
leading to the erroneous conclusion that the private-veto doctrine is far too sprawling and
unmanageable to be judicially enforced.
This Article is thus unique, not in its focus on the problem of delegation to private actors, but
in its particular focus on the problems associated with governmentally granted private vetoes over the
property or liberty interests of another. Its approach is novel in situating this doctrine in the context
of the well-established line of cases, including Grendel’s Den and Palmore, imposing limits on
governmental grants of power to private entities to regulate third parties based on their own prejudices
and non-pecuniary biases. And it is the first to propose a manageable doctrinal test for judging the
constitutionality of private vetoes. Finally, having made these contributions, this Article proposes
some important implications of this new framing of the private-veto doctrine for contemporary legal
and policy debates, particularly in the context of claims by religious individuals and institutions to
exemptions from generally applicable laws.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a history of the private-veto doctrine and its
development. Part I also compares and distinguishes this doctrine from the parallel doctrine of private
nondelegation. Part II then identifies the specific interests served by the private-veto doctrine and
outlines the appropriate doctrinal tests for courts to apply in determining whether a private veto is
constitutionally permissible. Finally, Part III considers the implications of a properly understood
private-veto doctrine for a number of legal problems, including the highly salient problem of laws
granting control to religious institutions and individuals over the property and liberty interests of third
parties.
I.

Delegations and Private Vetoes

Nondelegation doctrine is enjoying a revival. Some see signs from the most conservative wing
of the U.S. Supreme Court that it may be ready to reinstate limits on how much authority Congress
can give away to the executive branch17 and maybe even to private entities-thus promising to radically
constrain, if not entirely decimate, the modern administrative state. This Article is focused on one line
of cases—often treated together with other nondelegation cases—that involves a somewhat distinct
See generally Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); infra __.
See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 682-83; Bi–Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
17 See, e.g., supra note 13 (citing the various opinions in Gundy urging revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine); Dep't
of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 56 (2015) (rejecting a private nondelegation challenge with respect to
Amtrak based on the Court’s finding that Amtrak is a public, not private entity); id. at 61 (Alito, J., concurring) (asserting
that “Congress ‘cannot [constitutionally] delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.’” (quoting Ass'n of Am.
Railroads v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded, 575 U.S. 43 (2015))).
15
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problem: private vetoes. The private-veto line of cases has diverged from the nondelegation line of
cases, and rather than waxing and waning like nondelegation, the private-veto doctrine has retained
vitality and in fact made an appearance in a variety of constitutional doctrines. As discussed below,
these cases demonstrate courts’ concern with harm to others through arbitrary decisionmaking
motivated by self-interest or illicit bias. This concern overlaps with, but is not completely subsumed
by, the concerns that motivate other aspects of nondelegation doctrine. It is a concern that resonates
with a discourse of individual rights, equality, and equal citizenship, rather than more abstract, secondorder concerns about separation of powers and political accountability.Part A, below, traces the
private veto doctrine through its various manifestations over time, whereas Part B demonstrates how
the private veto doctrine differs from the “other” nondelegation doctrine.
A. A History of Private Veto Doctrine
1. The Original Trio: Eubank, Cusak, and Roberge (plus Yick Wo)
A trio of cases decided in the early decades of the twentieth century laid the foundation for
the private-veto doctrine: Eubank v. City of Richmond, Thomas Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago,18 and Washington
ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.19 These cases vindicate the fundamental legal principle that the
government may not grant arbitrary, standardless control to private individuals over the property of
others. Although the Supreme Court struggled in the wake of these cases to delimit the doctrine they
identified, often confusing it with other forms of “delegation,” the principle has remained a steadfast
and influential bedrock that has pollinated additional doctrinal offshoots.
In Eubank, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that allowed two-thirds of
property owners on a street to designate a setback for a lot on that street.20 The challenger in that case
had wanted to build a house with an octagonal bay window; the bay window would have jutted 3 feet
into the required setback of 14 feet, which was determined by the group of nearby property owners
while the building plans were being created.21 The Court found this delegation to private property
owners unconstitutional, explaining that it took sovereignty from the state and handed it to private
parties without any official oversight.22 Moreover, the Court pointed to the lack of standards to govern
the property owners’ decisions, noting that the law, “while conferring the power on some property
holders to virtually control and dispose of the property rights of others, creates no standard by which
the power is thus to be exercised,” such that “the property holders who desire and have the authority
to establish the line may do so for their own interest, or even capriciously.”23 In other words, the
standardless nature of the delegation opened up an invitation to arbitrary or self-interested
decisionmaking.
Only five years after Eubank was decided, the Court appeared ready to walk its holding back.
In Thomas Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago, the Court upheld a city ordinance that seemed to be plagued
with all the same problems it found in Eubank. The City of Chicago had given the power to a majority
of adjoining property owners to waive the city’s general prohibition on erecting billboards within
residential neighborhoods.24 An outdoor advertising company sued, claiming that the law denied it
242 U.S. 526 (1917).
278 U.S. 116 (1928).
20 226 U.S. at 144.
21 Id. at 141-42.
22 Id. at 143-44 (noting the lack of “discretion” given the official body to ignore the property owners’ wishes).
23 Id.
24 242 U.S. at 527-28.
18
19
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due process.25 The Court nonetheless upheld that law, reasoning that billboards belonged “in a class
by themselves” in terms of the nuisance they created, and therefore they could properly be outlawed
across the board by cities.26 Somewhat unconvincingly, the Court reasoned that the advertising
company actually benefited from the law, since it allowed the property owners to waive a general
nuisance prohibition, rather than impose a new restriction, as in Eubank.27 Characterizing the law as a
waiver of a prohibition on billboards, instead of as conditioning permission to erect a billboard on the
vote of private property owners, looks like an act of legal formalism seemingly designed purely to
evade Eubank.
But if the Court’s questionable reasoning in Cusak raised doubts about the continuing vitality
of the private-veto doctrine, the Court’s 1928 decision in Roberge laid them to rest. Similar to the
ordinance challenged in Eubank, the zoning ordinance at issue in Roberge provided a private veto to
nearby landowners over another landowner’s proposed land use.28 Similarly to Cusak, however, the
ordinance was written as a waiver provision—saying the property in question could only be used for
residential and certain other purposes unless the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet
of the proposed building consented to its use as a “philanthropic home for children or for old people,”
which was the precise use that the plaintiff desired.29 Striking down this aspect of the city zoning
ordinance, the Court distinguished Cusak as pertaining only to nuisances and revived Eubank’s holding
that giving nearby landowners “authority-uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative
action” over another’s property, without supervision by any public body, violated the Due Process
Clause.30
Interestingly, the Roberge Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins in highlighting its concern about
arbitrary use of power under the challenged ordinance.31 Yick Wo was a seminal case involving a
nineteenth-century San Francisco ordinance forbidding laundries to operate in buildings not made of
brick or stone, unless the operator obtained the consent of an official body, the board of supervisors.32
All of the petitions to that board by Chinese laundry owners were denied, whereas all petitions by
non-Chinese owners except one were granted.33 Many of those Chinese operators had been in business
at the same location for years, even decades.34 While the Court’s ultimate holding was grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause due to the law’s blatantly selective administration, the Court spent several
paragraphs highlighting the problem of laws that give wide and unbridled enforcement discretion to
public officials.35 For example, the Court observed that the laundry provision “seem intended to
confer, and actually to confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the
circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only as
Id. at 527.
Id. at 529. The Court noted the evidence at trial indicated “that fires had been started in the accumulation of
combustible material which gathered about such billboards; that offensive and insanitary accumulations are habitually
found about them, and that they afford a convenient concealment and shield for immoral practices, and for loiterers and
criminals.” Id.
27 Id. at 531 (“The one ordinance permits two thirds of the lot owners to impose restrictions upon the other property in
the block, while the other permits one half of the lot owners to remove a restriction from the other property owners.”).
28 278 U.S. at 117-18.
29 Id. at 118.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 122 (“They are not bound by any official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily
and may subject the trustee to their will or caprice.”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
32 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 373-74 (holding that the law was administered with “an evil eye and unequal hand”).
25
26

7

to places, but as to persons.”36 The Court then suggested, in a lengthy passage, that the principle at
issue in Yick Wo’s case was fundamental to the very nature of American democracy and the rule of
law:
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. . . . [I]n our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. …
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself.37
Thus, beyond the concern about the racial discrimination that the Court clearly perceived to be at
work in this specific case, it emphasized that it was incompatible with the rule of law and individual
liberty to grant unconstrained sovereignty, capable of being exercised discriminatorily or arbitrarily,
over people’s life, liberty, and “pursuit of happiness,” or “means of living.” It did not appear to matter
to the Court in Yick Wo and Roberge whether the one exercising arbitrary power was a public official
or another private citizen.38
2. Modern occupational licensing cases
Although the Supreme Court seemingly receded from the nondelegation doctrine, never again
to hold a private delegation unconstitutional after its 1935 decision in the Carter Coal case, discussed
below,39 the private-veto principle has in fact retained vitality—though it has often been couched in
other, more recognizable doctrines. For example, the doctrine has made inconsistent appearances in
cases challenging occupational licensing regimes.40 In Gibson v. Berryhill, the Supreme Court held that
the Alabama Board of Optometry, which was comprised exclusively of independent optometrists in
private practice, could not adjudicate the licenses of a corporation that employed competitor
optometrists, due to the intolerable likelihood that the independent optometrists’ financial interests
would come into play in their decisionmaking.41 On the other hand, in cases such as Withrow v. Larkin
and Friedman v. Rogers, the Court rejected similar claims that one group of professionals could not be
Id. at 366. In this way, the Court noted, it differed from other licensing laws in which a public official is to determine
the fitness of a particular applicant to run a particular business, “because in such cases the fact of fitness is submitted to
the judgment of the officer, and calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature,” rather than leaving it to the
officer’s arbitrary will. Id. at 368.
37 Id. at 369-70.
38 Cf. Benjamin Silver, Nondelegation in the States, supra note 11, at 34 (describing the “sovereignty theory” of nondelegation
doctrine as “the view that certain governmental functions must be exercised by public officials acting in their official
capacities” and extending this principle to interbranch and intergovernmental delegations by adding the qualifier that the
sovereignty must be exercised “by officials of the correct government”).
39 See, e.g., James M. Rice, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and
International Organizations, 105 CAL. L. REV. 539, 548 (2017).
40 There is an extensive literature critiquing the federal courts’ approach to reviewing occupational licensing schemes,
usually on the ground that the review is too deferential. See, e.g., Evan Bernick, Towards a Consistent Economic Liberty
Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 479, 480 (2016); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6 (1976); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-Stamps into Gavels: A Fresh Look at Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J.
FORUM 304, 305 (2016).
41 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
36
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permitted to sit in judgment over the ability of other professionals in the same field to continue to
practice.42
Courts have applied the doctrine directly in the context of abortion clinic regulations that
delegate to private institutions decisions upon which a clinic’s ability to operate depends. In 1974, in
Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources,43 a federal district court struck down a
licensing law for abortion facilities that required them to have a formal written agreement with a local
hospital and ambulance service to ensure, in the case of a complication requiring immediate attention,
the patient could access the hospital within fifteen minutes, or to certify that all physicians providing
abortions at the clinic have admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen minutes travel time.44
Because hospitals could control the clinics’ ability to stay open by granting or denying the required
agreement or admitting privileges, the North Carolina law created a delegation problem. Citing Yick
Wo, the court explained that “due process cannot tolerate a licensing system that makes the privilege
of doing business dependent on official whim.”45 Though in this case the delegation was to a private
rather than a governmental actor, the court faulted the government’s failure to limit or provide
standards for “the hospital’s decision to grant or withhold a transfer agreement, or even to ignore a
request for one.”46 Moreover, analogizing to a case in which the court had struck down a law requiring
spousal consent for an abortion, the court highlighted both the fact that this case involved arbitrary
power affecting individuals’ constitutional rights and the fact that the state purported “to grant
hospitals power it does not have itself”—namely, “an arbitrary power to veto the performance of
abortions for any reason or no reason at all.”47 On much the same grounds, a Michigan district court
struck down a similar state law requiring written agreements concerning emergency hospital
admissions.48
More recent cases in the abortion context have also relied up the private-veto doctrine to strike
similar licensing requirements on abortion facilities.49 For example, a Wisconsin district court struck
down as an impermissible delegation a state law requiring abortion providers to have admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of their practice.50 And in Women’s Medical Professional
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1975); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,17-18 (1975). In Friedman, “commercial”
optometrists challenged the composition of the state optometry board, which was composed only of “professional”
optometrists hostile to the “commercial” approach. The Court rejected the notion that commercial practitioners had to
be included on the board in order to avoid bias, but it emphasized at the same time that the commercial optometrists
had “a constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing in any disciplinary proceeding” by the board. Friedman, 440 U.S.
at 18.
43 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. N. Car. 1974), aff’d on other grounds, 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975).
44 Id. at 1156-57.
45 Id. at 1158.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1158-59.
48 Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 580 F. Supp. 1366, 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d on other grounds, 743 F.2d 352
(6th Cir. 1984). Though both decisions were appealed, neither resulted in an appellate court decision upholding the
private veto holding, because in neither case was that particular aspect of the court’s holding appealed. Hallmark Clinic
v. N. Car. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 519 F.2d 1315, 1316 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that the defendants had not appealed—only
the plaintiffs had appealed the denial of attorney fees, which the defendants claimed was proper because they
“vigorously resist[ed] any attempt to impute to them the conduct of the hospital authorities”); Birth Control Centers,
Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 356 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984).
49 See generally Jessie Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, 109 GEO. L.J. 1081, 1132-36 (2021); Jacqueline Y. Ma, “Undue”
Delegation: Private Delegation and Other Strategies to Challenge Admitting-Privileges Laws, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 549, 581-89
(2016).
50 Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 997 (W.D. Wis.) (“[T]he State cannot
impose this requirement through third parties, at least in the admitted absence of a waiver or some other mechanism to
42
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Corporation v. Baird, citing both Yick Wo and Roberge, the Sixth Circuit rejected an abortion clinic’s claim
that the requirement to obtain a written transfer agreement with a local hospital in order to continue
operating was an “impermissible delegation of authority to a third party.”51 However, the claim failed
only because the purported private veto could be overridden by the state health director if the director
found that it caused undue hardship and that the health and safety goals could be met through alternate
means—thus introducing both standards and governmental oversight to the licensing decision.52
Similarly, because hospitals were required by law to provide due process protections, include notice
and a hearing, when denying admitting privileges, an Arizona law requiring admitting privileges for
abortion providers was similarly upheld by the Ninth Circuit against a nondelegation challenge.53 But
the basic principle—that the state may not grant a private veto over another’s business license, without
providing standards or official review—remained unquestioned.
Admittedly, in other cases, courts have appeared more reluctant to apply this doctrine to
abortion clinic licensing regulations. For example, courts have rejected challenges to admitting
privileges requirements imposed directly on physicians who perform abortions rather than as a
condition of licensing for abortion clinics, asserting simply that the law “involve[d] state regulation of
the qualifications of persons who perform abortions rather than standards for licensure of abortion
clinics.”54 In other cases, courts have either cursorily rejected such claims or simply avoided them.55
State courts, similarly, have sometimes struck down occupational licensing requirements as
delegating excessive authority to private individuals or to public officials, though the actual
constitutional grounds for those decisions has varied widely.56 For example, in Fink v. Cole, the New
York Court of Appeals held that a state law delegating final licensing power to a private corporation,
the Jockey Club, was unconstitutional both because it violated the state constitutional clause vesting
legislative power only in the state legislature, and also because of its “lack of guides and proper

ensure due process.”), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th
Cir. 2015).
51 Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 (6th Cir. 2006).
52 Id.; cf. id. at 609 (“Hospitals have the unfettered power to decide whether or not to enter into an agreement. Director
Baird admitted that Ohio has no power over hospitals to direct them as to how to respond to requests for written
transfer agreements and that hospitals could deny such a request for business, religious, personal, or political reasons.”).
53 Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 556 (9th Cir. 2004); cf. Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C.
Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 317 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a state’s
admitting privileges requirement on the ground that it was “so obviously beneficial to patients” and “the possibility that
the requirements will amount to a third-party veto power is so remote,” as well as the fact that the requirement could be
waived by a public official).
54 Women's Health Ctr. of W. Cty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Planned Parenthood of
Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a nondelegation claim on the
same grounds as Webster).
55 In other recent cases, courts have declined to reach such claims, or plaintiffs have declined to press them. See EMW
Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Glisson, No. 3:17-CV-00189-GNS, 2018 WL 6444391, at *28 n.29 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28,
2018), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 2020)
(declining to reach the nondelegation claim); Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 n.2
(S.D. Miss. 2013) (noting that the plaintiffs “reserved” their nondelegation claim and “advis[ing] Plaintiffs to assert their
arguments if they deem them worthy”), aff'd as modified, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin,
Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 922 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming the Wisconsin district court’s decision without reaching the
nondelegation claim).
56 See Goerge W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 695
(1975) (noting courts’ “fairly consistent hostility toward statute vesting licensing power in private groups when these
groups are not clothed in the raiment of a public board and no review is provided,” and predominantly citing state court
cases); id. at 653 (noting that “Carter [Coal] is still enthusiastically cited by state courts”).
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standards” for the Jockey Club’s exercise of discretion.57 Thus, the court noted, the law would be
unconstitutional even if this form of discretion were exercised by a government official.58 Indeed, the
Arkansas Supreme Court even held unconstitutional a hospital admitting privileges process itself,
when it required the approval of a private group before privileges would be granted. In Ware v. Benedikt,
a duly licensed German-born physician challenged a public hospital’s denial of admitting privileges to
him, which was ostensibly based on his failure to attain membership in or the recommendation of the
county medical society (a private association).59 The association denied the physician’s membership
application, without providing a reason, a dozen times during the 1940s and 1950s.60 Noting that “[a]
medical society is a private organization whose membership conceivably may bestow or withhold
approval of a fellow physician's application for a valid reason, or for no reason at all,” the court held
that the denial of access to the public hospital for reasons that are “unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious
or discriminatory” was invalid, without specifying a constitutional basis for its holding.61 Similarly, the
California Supreme Court struck down as denying equal protection a law requiring opticians, in order
to become licensed, to practice under the supervision of another licensed optician for at least 5 years,
as “confer[ring] upon presently licensed dispensing opticians the unlimited and unguided power to
exclude from their profession any or all persons” without any review by a public official or agency.62
Of course, it is easy to see how this private veto principle might spiral out of control, drawing into
question nearly all professional licensing schemes. For example, the requirement to attend an ABAaccredited law school in order to receive a license to practice law in some sense delegates veto power
to those law schools, without any meaningful legal standards to guide their admissions or graduation
decisions.63 Thus, courts have not always adhered strictly to the private-veto principle even in the
licensing context.64 As discussed below in Part II, however, many of these cases rejecting
nondelegation challenges in the licensing context can be explained using a proper understanding of
private-veto principle.
3. Prejudgment seizure
In their concern about private control over another’s property interests, the licensing cases bear a
resemblance to cases involving prejudgment seizure by private parties. In a series of cases decided in
the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down state laws allowing individuals or
companies to seize, or order the seizure of, another person’s property—for example, to cover an
unpaid debt or missed payments on an installment plan—without first getting a judgment from a court
Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 225 (1951) (citing Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184,
192 (1948) (“[I]t would be intolerable for the Legislature to hand over to any official or group of officials, an unlimited,
unrestrained, undefined power to make such regulations as he or they should desire, and to grant or refuse licenses to
such schools, depending on their compliance with such regulations.”)).
58 Id.
59 Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 186 (1955).
60 Id. One could certainly speculate that anti-German bias, related to the recent World War, played a role in the group’s
decision.
61 Id. at 187-89.
62 Blumenthal v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235 (1962); see also id. at 236-37 (citing cases from other state
courts reaching similar conclusions in analogous cases involving occupational licensing laws); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that an association of optometrists with a financial interest in the matter could not judge a
disciplinary case involving another group of optometrists).
63 In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796–97 (Minn. 1978) (upholding such a requirement against a nondelegation
challenge).
64 See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, JANICE C. GRIFFITH, EVAN C. ZOLDAN & CYNTHIA
BAKER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 697-98 (9th ed. 2020) (collecting cases on both sides).
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and with very little in the way of procedural safeguards to ensure the seizure was warranted.65 These
statutes thus involved a form of delegation of coercive power—a private veto over another’s use of
her property—without standards and without substantive government oversight.66
In one of those cases, Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court noted its concern that the challenged statutory
procedures—which allowed a private person or company to enlist the sheriff to repossess goods
purchased on an installment contract after filing paperwork with the court clerk but without any actual
judicial oversight—ran a high risk of error or abuse because the seizing party’s own “private gain” was
at stake.67 Indeed, though the Court did not highlight it, the facts in one case suggested that the private
veto may have been used not just for financial gain but to further a personal grudge: one victim of a
seizure had been in a custody dispute with her ex-husband, who also happened to be the local deputy
sheriff. Being familiar with the seizure procedure, he used it to seize their child’s toys, clothes, and
furniture.68
4. Other constitutional contexts
Outside the occupational licensing context, the private veto doctrine can be seen most clearly
in another line of cases dealing with licensing decisions. Going back almost as far as the first decisions
incorporating the First Amendment against the states, the Supreme Court has recognized that
individual speakers may “challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing
discretion to an administrative office.”69 Thus, laws providing for censorship boards or licensing of
speech must provide procedural safeguards including prompt access to judicial review, during which
the speech must be allowed to take place until adjudicated impermissible.70 Of course, unlike the
abortion clinic and other occupational licensing cases, this line of cases is decided under the Free
Speech Clause—the theory being that in the absence of procedural safeguards, speech licensing laws
confer “a species of unbridled discretion” on administrators and therefore to create an unacceptable
risk of suppressing speech protected by the First Amendment.71 And, like Yick Wo, they involved
arbitrary vetoes by government officials rather than by private actors. But the key principle in these
cases is ultimately the same as in the cases based on the Due Process Clause: that it is unconstitutional
for a law to provide an arbitrary veto over others’ exercise of their property or liberty rights (which,
as discussed below, includes their rights to free speech).72

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972); Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Cf. Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (upholding Louisiana’s prejudgment sequestration procedure and
distinguishing Fuentes on the ground that greater safeguards against error or abuse, including judicial involvement, were
provided by the Louisiana law).
66 Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, supra note 15, at 1444 (suggesting that some of the Supreme Court’s prejudgment seizure cases
can be understood as implying that “the power to resolve disputes on a nonconsensual basis, even subject to later state
court review, is one that government cannot delegate to private actors without preserving some opportunity for prior
review”).
67 Id. at 83 (“Since his private gain is at stake, the danger is all too great that his confidence in his cause will be
misplaced.”).
68 Id. at 72 (noting that this party’s experience “had been more bizarre”).
69 Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) and
other cases involving licensing of speech).
70 Id. at 59-60; FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (plurality op.).
71 FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 223.
72 Infra Part II.A.2; cf. City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 783 (2004) (finding no First
Amendment violation where the licensing decision is governed by “reasonably objective, nondiscretionary criteria
unrelated to the content of the expressive materials,” even in the absence of special statutory provisions ensuring a
prompt judicial decision if the license is denied).
65
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The private-veto principle likewise makes an appearance in other constitutional cases that may
not initially appear to involve nondelegation claims. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that allowed a church to veto the liquor license of any
establishment located within a five hundred-foot radius of it.73 The Grendel’s Den decision was based
on the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution: the Court found that the law “substitutes the
unilateral and absolute power of a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body
acting on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and political
implications.”74 But the Court’s language drew on many of the same themes as the private-veto cases.
For example, the Court noted that the law “delegate[d] to private, nongovernmental entities power to
veto certain liquor license applications,” explicitly reserving the question whether such a delegation to
private secular entities would ever be constitutional.75 The Court also emphasized the “standardless”
nature of the power exercised by churches, noting there was no bulwark against the church using that
governmentally delegated power to advance religious aims.76 In fact, given that the ordinance actually
delegated power over liquor licenses not only to churches but also to schools (whether secular or
religious), the restaurant challenging the law had also raised a nondelegation claim, which was found
meritorious by the trial court.77 Citing Eubank and Roberge and distinguishing Cusak, the lower court
had pointed to the standardless, unreviewable “veto” provided to private parties in concluding that
the law violated due process principles.78
Similarly, the case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center is not generally thought of as a
nondelegation case, yet, the facts of Cleburne are strikingly similar to those of Roberge. In both cases,
a private person wished to construct a group home that was considered undesirable to the neighbors,
and was initially blocked from doing so due to the resistance of those neighbors. In the case of Roberge,
the proposed land use was a home “for aged poor,” and in Cleburne, it was a group home for
intellectually disabled individuals.79 In Roberge, the private veto power was provided to nearby property
owners by city ordinance, whereas in Cleburne, the veto arose in part from members of the community
who exhibited or would likely exhibit prejudice toward the group home’s residents.80 The City
explicitly referenced those community members’ concerns as a basis for denying the permit.81
Although the Court disapproved Cleburne’s decision to block the establishment of the group home
based on the Equal Protection Clause, applying rational basis review, it spoke in terms that resonate
with the private-veto cases when it dismissed the City’s concern “that the facility was across the street
from a junior high school, and it feared that the students might harass the occupants of the [group]
459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
Id. at 127.
75 Id. at 122.
76 Id. at 125-26. As an example, the Court suggests “favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation or
adherents of that faith.” Id. In a related vein, the Fourth Circuit held that the denial of a permit to an individual seeking
to operate a palmistry business was arbitrary and therefore violated the individual’s due process rights, in part because it
was motivated by religious objections to the nature of the business. Marks v. City of Chesapeak, 883 F.2d 308, 312 (4th
Cir. 1989).
77 Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D. Mass. 1980).
78 Id. at 765-66. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision on the nondelegation claim,
however, determining that the facts were more analogous to Cusak than to Eubank and Roberge. Grendel’s Den v.
Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 90-95 (1st Cir. 1981).
79 State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Tr. Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117 (1928); City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
80 Roberge, 278 U.S. at 117; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50.
81 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (“[T] he Council was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of property
owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood.”).
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home.”82 “[D]enying a permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears,” the Court said, “is again
permitting some portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an equal protection
violation.”83
In other words, the City of Cleburne had failed to come up with a rational basis for its zoning
decision, and essentially providing a private veto over this land use to individual members of the
community, acting on their private prejudices, is also constitutionally unacceptable.84 Indeed, the group
home operators had raised a nondelegation claim in the lower courts, but subsequently abandoned
it.85 Nonetheless, in their Supreme Court brief, in the context of arguing that the Cleburne decision
lacked a rational basis, the Cleburne Living Center again gestured toward the private-veto principle.
Citing Eubank and Roberge, the brief asserted, “Although there has been no formal delegation, the City
nonetheless is precluded from claiming a legitimate governmental interest in simply capitulating to
those vague, undefined ‘citizens’ interests’ by requiring a special use permit for group homes for
[intellectually disabled] people, but not for other congregate living situations which result in equally
intensive uses of property.”86
Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that private prejudices
should play a role in official decisions regarding child custody. In Palmore, a state court judge had
awarded custody to a child’s father due solely to the mother’s remarriage to a Black man—not because
that marriage affected the mother’s fitness but because, in the state court’s view, the best interests of
the child would be served by avoiding the societal discrimination and stigma she would face as the
child of an interracial couple.87 The Court described the question before it as “whether the reality of
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of
an infant child from the custody of its natural mother,” and quickly concluded that they were not.88
As in Cleburne, the Court decided the case on equal protection rather than due process grounds; and
as in Cleburne, the Court in Palmore essentially held that the Constitution does not permit individuals
to exercise a private veto over another person’s liberty or property interest.89 In fact, the Cleburne
Living Center’s Supreme Court brief cited Palmore, alongside Eubank and Roberge, for its nondelegation
point.90
The cases reviewed here, which appear outside the due-process context, demonstrate the
bedrock nature of the private-veto principle. Although cases such as Cleburne and Palmore did not
involve actual vetoes exercised by private individuals through a grant of governmental authority, they
present striking analogies to the private-veto doctrine. They illustrate a deep-seated and transsubstantive concern with ensuring equal citizenship is not undermined by the government

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
Id.
84 Id.; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the City
took into account “the attitude of a majority of owners of property located within two hundred (200) feet of” the
proposed group home in reaching its decision), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
85 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437 n.5 (noting that the “Court of Appeals did not address this [nondelegation] argument, and it
has not been raised by the parties in this Court”).
86 Brief for Respondents, City of Cleburne, Texas, et al., Petitioners, v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al., Respondents.,
1985 WL 668980 (U.S.), at 16.
87 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-32 (1984).
88 Id. at 433.
89 Id. at 433-34.
90 Brief for Respondents, City of Cleburne, Texas, et al., Petitioners, v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al., Respondents.,
1985 WL 668980 (U.S.), at 16-17.
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empowering private individuals to deprive others of their property or liberty based on religious, racial,
or other illicit motivations that are off-limits for the government itself to act upon.
B. The Other Nondelegation Doctrine
Not long after Roberge, the Supreme Court introduced another species of nondelegation
doctrine. Famously, in a pair of cases decided in 1935—and never again—the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional the delegation of federal legislative power to executive agencies because there was no
“intelligible principle” to constrain the agencies’ exercise of power, in that it ran afoul of the
constitutionally prescribed separation of powers.91 And while both Panama Refining and Schechter struck
down delegations outside the legislative branch to other public officials, both Schechter and a case
decided the following year, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,92 also discussed delegations of regulatory power to
private entities.
In Schechter, the Court found that the National Industrial Recovery Act delegated insufficiently
constrained authority to the executive branch.93 It also noted, however, that the law conferred power
on private industry groups, as well, to draft regulatory rules that would be approved or disapproved
by the President. Though the crux of the case turned on the public delegation (to the President) rather
than this private delegation (to the industry groups), because the industry groups did not have the
ultimate say on whether their rules would be adopted, the Court was nonetheless troubled by the
private delegation. “[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative
authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they
deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?,” the
Court asked. “Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that
purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises?” The
Court thought the answer was “obvious”: “Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our
law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”94 Thus,
while Schechter was a separation-of-powers decision, the Court seemed to invoke the specter of selfdealing, and hence the concern for protecting the rights of regulated individuals, mentioned in the
other private-veto cases.
In Carter Coal, a federal law had granted authority to a group of coal producers and laborers—
companies that produced two-thirds of the total national production, plus one half of the miners—to
set maximum hours and minimum wages for the entire industry.95 The Court agreed with
representatives of the objecting producers that this delegation was unconstitutional—citing the Due
Process Clause rather than separation of powers—because granting “the majority…the power to
regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority” constituted “an intolerable and unconstitutional
interference with personal liberty and private property.”96 In fact, the Court cited Eubank and Roberge,
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
433 (1935). Specifically, the delegations violated the Vesting Clause in Article I, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which
provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art.
1, s.1; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529. Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421. While the Court never again found a delegation
unconstitutional, it often stated or assumed—both before and after Schechter—the maxim that Congress could not
delegate legislative its power. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249 (1947); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-07 (1928).
92 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
93 295 U.S. at 542.
94 Id. at 537.
95 Id. at 310-11.
96 Id. at 311.
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along with Schechter, in support of its holding.97 As in Eubank, Yick Wo, and Schechter, the Court worried
that the power would be exercised not just arbitrarily, but in the financial self-interest of the delegate.98
Perhaps because of the multifarious delegations involved in Schechter and Carter Coal, both
courts and scholars have sometimes grouped various sorts of delegations under the broad heading of
nondelegation doctrine and then attempted to derive principles that apply to all of them. In light of
the distinctiveness of the private-veto doctrine, however, this tendency has often led to incorrect
framing of the issues. In particular, it has led commentators to miss two of the most important aspects
of the private-veto principle: that it is concerned not just with pecuniary self-interest but also with bias
and illicit prejudice; and that it often involves private control over another’s constitutionally protected
property or liberty interest. The latter point is important because it affects the nature of the due process
analysis. The former point is important because it makes the private-veto principle understandable as
a doctrine that vindicates and advances important constitutional interests—including an interest in
equal protection of the laws—rather than as a revival of long-abandoned economic substantive due
process, as some commentators have charged.99
Numerous commentators have considered the private veto doctrine to be a subcategory of
the nondelegation doctrine—beginning, perhaps, with Louis Jaffe’s classic 1937 article, Lawmaking by
Private Groups.100 More recently, Harold Abramson observed that the Supreme Court has
“commingled” the concepts of “nondelegation of legislative power” in several cases stretching back
to the early decades of the twentieth century by using the language of nondelegation in cases involving
due process issues, and vice versa.101 Similarly, scholars surveying the landscape of nondelegation
doctrine have included the private-veto cases as a subcategory of delegation of lawmaking power,
assuming that the same purposes motivate this doctrine and that the same analytical framework should
apply.102 Thus, the conventional accounts of nondelegation often over-emphasize separation-ofpowers and political accountability concerns.
Whether correct or not, this submerging of the private veto cases under the broader topic of
delegation has led many to miss key facets of the doctrine. Of course, there are clear similarities
between the private-veto doctrine and the other nondelegation doctrine. Both are fundamentally
concerned with the question whether clear standards (or “intelligible principles”) exist to constrain the
delegate’s discretion.103 The need for such standards is at least partly motivated by a concern about
arbitrary action by the delegate, as well as by a concern that the delegate may use the delegated power
to advance its own private pecuniary interests.104

Id. at 312.
Id. at 311.
99 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 14, at 673.
100 Louis L. Jaffe, Lawmaking by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937); id. at 227-29.
101 Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 165, 208-10 (1989); see also Volokh, supra note 11, at 977-79 (similarly pointing out the Court’s apparent confusion).
102 See, e.g., Silver, supra note 11, draft at 9 (describing various species of state nondelegation rule as “a single doctrine);
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., supra note 12, at 50 (describing Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal as private nondelegation cases and
suggesting that there is no clear principle that can explain why these delegations were unconstitutional); Larkin, supra
note 3, at 314–15 (“The problem [in cases like Eubank and Roberge] is that the delegation evades the constitutional
restrictions on the lawmaking process established by Articles I, II, and III of the federal Constitution and the
comparable provisions in every state charter.”); Metzger, supra note 15, at 1438 & n.239 (discussing Eubank, Cusak, and
Roberge as examples of nondelegation doctrine); Liebmann, supra note 56, at 675-80 (same).
103 See Volokh, supra note 11, at 978 (“Entrusting a decision to the unreviewable and unguided discretion of private
parties is the opposing of having an ‘intelligible principle.’”).
104 See supra.
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Beyond this similarity, however, the doctrines diverge in important respects. One way in which
they differ is that the concern about political accountability raised by the nondelegation doctrine is
less salient in the context of private vetoes. Some commentators have argued that any delegation of
governmental power to a private entity—as opposed to a public official—is potentially problematic
because private individuals are not politically accountable in the way that public officials are.105 If a
public official acts irresponsibly, that person can normally be removed through election, or, if an
appointed official, the politician who appointed that person can pay an electoral price.106 But private
delegates cannot be removed from any office, since they are by definition not elected officials.
In the context of private vetoes, however, political accountability is not a primary concern.
The actions taken by private delegates are generally small-scale, even one-off decisions—such as
denying admitting privileges to an individual physician, or denying a liquor license to one restaurant.
The primary concern in private-veto cases is not with large-scale rulemaking or quasi-legislative acts
by private entities, but rather with individual deprivations of property or liberty without due process.
For this reason, cases such as Carter Coal and Schechter, involving delegation of rulemaking power to
private groups, while often referred to as “private delegation” cases, are excluded from this Article’s
analysis of private veto power.107 The problem with private vetoes is not generally how large the
delegation is—for large delegations would likely be more visible and thus more likely to attract
oversight—but how small-scale, intimate, and likely to escape scrutiny.108
The relative lack of concern with political accountability demonstrates the affiliation between
cases involving private vetoes and those involving standardless discretion is vested in a public official.
The standardless delegation—effected by an official decision, law, or regulation and allowing arbitrary
decisionmaking—is the act that potentially violates due process.109 Although private groups and
individuals—especially those who are competitors, property owners, or others whose interests are
affected by the actions of the regulated party—may be more likely to have interests at stake and
therefore be more likely act arbitrarily or in their own personal interest—the standardlessness of the
delegation, rather than the identity of the delegate, is the principal issue. For this reason, it is
unsurprising to see cases involving delegations of power to private parties citing Yick Wo, which
involved the standardless and arbitrary exercise of power by a public official. Thus, private vetoes are
problematic not because they involve delegations of power that should be exercised by public
officials,110 but because they involve delegations of power to private parties that the government itself

Zoldan, supra note 14, at 105; Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private Parties,
65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 511 (2011).
106 As Alexander Volokh notes, this logic is somewhat questionable. Volokh, supra note 11, at 972 (“One purpose is
accountability: a private delegation dilutes democratic accountability, because when power is delegated to a private
organization, the government is no longer blamed for that organization's decisions. (Perhaps; but if something goes
wrong, why can't the voters blame the government for the initial decision to delegate?)” (foonotes omitted)).
107 See also, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
108 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2019) (arguing that “the nondelegation
doctrine, properly understood, concerns both the degree of discretion afforded to the holder of lawmaking power and the
extent of the underlying power itself”).
109 Cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 171 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion that a private veto
did not implicate state action, where the law “specifically authorize[d]” a private party “to sell respondents' possessions;
… detail[ed] the procedures that [private party] must follow; and it grant[ed] [the private party] the power to convey
good title to goods … to a third party”).
110 See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 3, at 314.
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could not exercise. The government could not, consistent with due process and equal protection, close
abortion clinics or arbitrarily limit the property rights of some property owners but not others.111
Understanding that the private-veto doctrine is primarily concerned with arbitrary harm to
individuals’ interests, with similarities to the “class of one” equal protection doctrine, leads to greater
clarity, moreover, about exactly which constitutional values are served by a prohibition on private
vetoes, as compared to nondelegation doctrine more generally. The general nondelegation doctrine is
primarily grounded in separation-of-powers and rule-of-law values. The abovementioned concern
about accountability stems from these values. But the due-process-grounded private-veto doctrine is
primarily concerned with actual harm to individuals’ property or liberty interests resulting from
decisions made by other individuals, entities, or groups, either arbitrarily or—even worse—based on
private financial or other biases.
In particular, concerns about irrational prejudices—whether based on attributes specifically
recognized as suspect classifications by the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence or not—
seem to drive many of the private-veto cases discussed above. Though not explicitly stated in the
cases, we can easily surmise that illicit interests and biases likely motivated the private delegates’ vetoes.
Irrational disapproval or fear of the “aged poor” was likely a driving force in Roberge; disapproval of
abortion led hospitals to deny admitting privileges in Baird and similar cases; prejudice against a
German-born physician after World War II was likely the reason for the denial of medical association
membership in Ware; the unsavory and unpopular nature of sexually explicit speech may lead
regulators to delay issuing a license;112 religiously based disapproval of drinking establishments likely
played a role in the church’s veto of a liquor license for Grendel’s Den; assumed or actual prejudice
against intellectually disabled individuals resulted in the denial of the Cleburne living center’s zoning
variance; and so on.113 The private veto doctrine thus exists not only to ensure that individuals are not
deprived of their liberty or property arbitrarily, or in the service of others’ financial gain, but also, and
importantly, to protect unpopular individuals and businesses against that harm from hard-to-detect
illicit prejudices.114 In all the ink that has been spilled over “private nondelegation” doctrine, this point
has largely gone unnoticed. While commentators have worried that the nondelegation doctrine is in
actuality a revival of economic substantive due process under a different name, this unmistakable
thread of protection against discriminatory harm shows its clear affiliation to more venerable
Cf. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection
claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (striking down a spousal consent requirement for women seeking
abortions on the ground that “the State cannot ‘delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and
totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
112 See, e.g., City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 787 (2004) (“[A]lthough Littleton's ordinance
is not as suspect as censorship, neither is it as innocuous as common zoning. It is a licensing scheme triggered by the
content of expressive materials to be sold. Because the sellers may be unpopular with local authorities, there is a risk of
delay in the licensing and review process.” (citations omitted)).
113 See also Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, No. 2:15-CV-04273-NKL, 2015 WL 9463198 (W.D. Mo. Dec.
28, 2015) (upholding “class of one” equal protection challenge to occupational licensing requirement based on animus
toward abortion providers).
114
It is much more difficult to demonstrate that an individual decision is arbitrary or based on individual self-interest
than it is to show arbitrariness based upon a pattern across multiple decisions; think of peremptory challenges to jurors,
which generally survive scrutiny so long as the attorney comes up with a barely-plausible rationale, as compared to a
statistical study showing exclusion of jurors based on race. See, e.g., Jury—Challenges and Objections - Challenging Peremptorily
All Negroes on Jury Panel by Federal Prosecutor Held Not Improper, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1455, 1456-57 (1948).
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constitutional doctrines.115 For this reason, and as demonstrated above in Part I.A., the principle spans
multiple constitutional doctrines, including not only due process and equal protection, but also the
First Amendment’s Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.116
Finally, unlike nondelegation doctrines, the private veto doctrine is concerned less with what
kind of power is being exercised—for example, determining whether the power is uniquely
“governmental” and if so, whether it is legislative or adjudicative in nature—and more concerned with
the object of that power.117 As discussed below, because the private-veto doctrine grows out of dueprocess concerns, it is most relevant when a private veto is exercised over the property or liberty
interests of another person or entity. Yet, again, even when recognizing the due-process origins of the
doctrine, commentators have not generally even considered the question of what the object of the
delegated power is.
II.

Doubling Down on Due Process

Several scholars have recognized that some types of private delegations—including those that
I have called “private vetoes”—primarily raise due process problems, rather than Vesting Clause or
other separation-of-powers issues. Thus, they have explored whether the cases dealing with private
delegations involve substantive or procedural due process.118 They have not pushed the analysis
further, however, such as by describing the proper due-process analysis to apply to private delegations.
In some instances, commentators have essentially assumed that the prohibition on delegations of
government power to private individuals is categorical, rather than subject to a doctrinal test.119 This
Article therefore fills this gap with respect to the private-veto doctrine by situating those cases squarely
within traditional due-process case law and analysis.
This Article assumes that both procedural due process and substantive due process may be
violated by a law granting a private veto. Procedural due process applies in an adjudicative context
when the delegation results in a non-neutral decisionmaker, or when the delegation deprives a private
party of a constitutionally recognized liberty or property interest without procedural safeguards.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, applies when the decisionmaking is substantively arbitrary.
While some showing of arbitrariness thus must be made, it is not clear that a protected property or
liberty interest must be identified in order for substantive due process to invalidate a private veto.
Thus, in private-veto cases, depending on the facts, one or the other or both due process doctrines

See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 14, at 673; Metzger, supra note 15, at 1442-43.
See Liebmann, supra note 56, at 660 (observing that “many of the vices inherent in delegation to private groups
constitute violations of express constitutional mandates—particularly the requirements of due process and equal
protection” and noting the “proximity of the nondelegation principle to other constitutional safeguards”).
117 See, e.g., Liebmann, supra note 56, at 718 (arguing that the distinction between exercises of legislative and judicial
powers “is more relevant in resolving these problems of delegation than many have been prone to assume”).
118 See, e.g., Craig Konnoth, Privatization's Preemptive Effects, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1937, 1979-81 (2021); Lawrence, supra note
14, at 678-86; see generally Volokh, supra note 11, at 940-54 (considering the Eubank-Cusak-Roberge line of cases as
procedural due process cases); Abramson, supra note 101, at 214-16 (same); Larkin, supra note 3, at 315 (“Eubank, Roberge,
and Carter Coal therefore cannot readily be characterized as examples of either type of due process doctrine.”); cf. Nathan
S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1677, 1755-59 (2012)
(discussing legislation that “takes from A and gives to B” as a violation of procedural due process).
119 Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 359 (2016)
(“Schechter did more than just construe the intelligible-principle imperative as a rule. It also layered on an additional,
equally categorical rule barring delegations of state authority to private parties. This ‘private delegation’ carve-out
barred all delegations of rulemaking authority to private parties.”)
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may apply. It is therefore important to develop the due process analysis under each rubric in order to
identify both the scope of the private-veto doctrine and its limits.
Briefly stated, the procedural due process strain of private-veto doctrine is invoked when a
constitutionally-recognized property or liberty interest is placed at the mercy of a single or small
number of private individuals or entities in an adjudicative or other individualized decisionmaking
context. If the private delegation is not subject to a standards-driven official or judicial review, the
due-process requirements of a neutral decisionmaker and sufficient procedural safeguards cannot be
met. The substantive due process doctrine is involved in cases whether the private delegate’s actions
suggest actual bias or arbitrariness, not just a risk thereof. A lack of meaningful standards can
contribute to, but will not necessarily be enough for, such a showing. Though a protected liberty or
property interest is not required in the substantive due process paradigm, heightened judicial scrutiny
will apply if such an interest is at stake.
A. Procedural Due Process
1. Framework for analysis
As it is traditionally understood, the procedural dimension of due process protects against
governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law.”120 Due process
of law includes notice and an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner” before a neutral decision-maker.121 These requirements apply only if a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest is at stake. A property interest must be one that is recognized by
positive law as an entitlement—not a mere unilateral expectation.122 A liberty interest can include
freedom from physical constraint (such as incarceration), but it can also include the fundamental
constitutional interests that are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
“liberty”—i.e., all of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights, as well as the fundamental rights to
family privacy and decision-making autonomy protected by the doctrine of substantive due process.123
Once it has been established that a person is threatened with governmental deprivation of a
life, liberty, or property interest, the question becomes, “what process is due?” In addition to the
requirement of notice and an impartial decisionmaker, the requirement of a meaningful opportunity
to be heard may entail specific procedural safeguards.124 In deciding whether the opportunity to be
heard is sufficient, the Supreme Court has prescribed a three-part balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge
that weighs (1) the importance of the individual’s private property or liberty interest against (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”125

U.S. CONST. amdts. V, XIV; 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND NOWAK'S TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1. While the Due Process Clause’s protection for “life” is
obviously important, it is not discussed here because I have not identified any instances of private vetoes being provided
by government over another’s life; thus, this Article (and the existing doctrine) focus on the liberty and property aspects
of the Due Process Clause.
121 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1965); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, at § 17.8(a).
122 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, at § 17.5(a).
123 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, at § 17.4(a).
124 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, at § 17.8(i).
125 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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As the balancing test indicates, one of the key purposes of the constitutional protection for
procedural due process is to avoid erroneous or otherwise improper deprivations of important
personal interests in property and in constitutional rights. Of course, as a “Bill of Rights protection[]
meant to insure individual liberty in the face of contrary collective action,” it also serves other interests
as well, such as dignitary interests, basic fairness, and supporting the legitimacy governmental
regulations.126
2. Application to the private-veto doctrine
The private-veto doctrine implicates procedural due process. Indeed, it is often applied in
adjudicative contexts that clearly involve property interests, such as the land use, prejudgment seizure,
and occupational licensing contexts.127 But it is also clear that a private veto must affect a
constitutionally protected interest in order for procedural due process to apply; if no such protected
property or liberty interest is involved, the analysis must stop there. Yet, many commentators have
simply glossed over this fact—a fact that can significantly limit the doctrine’s otherwise potentially
boundless application—even when arguing that the procedural due process framework is the correct
one.128 As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Baird, while “first-time applicants for liquor
or entertainment licenses do not have a protected property interest,” owners of existing businesses do
have a property interest in their “continued operation.”129 Thus, the procedural due process analysis
would not apply when the licensee is being denied a first-time license.130
When a constitutional liberty is involved, such as the freedom of speech, courts tend to analyze
the delegation under the substantive constitutional provision implicated—as in the line of cases
dealing with licensing of sexually explicit or other objectionable speech. Although these cases also
involve licensing decisions, they may or may not involve existing licenses; the existence of a
constitutional right (and thus a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment) is sufficient
to call forth the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. Thus Grendel’s Den, involving a
church’s power to veto a restaurant’s liquor license, was decided under the First Amendment, even
though the key problem in these cases was arguably the standardlessness and risk of religiouslymotivated bias inherent in the veto power.131 Similarly, the line of cases dealing with licensing laws for

Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-57 (1976).
127 See generally Aaron J. Reber & Karin Mika, Democratic Excess in the Use of Zoning Referenda, 29 URB. LAW. 277 (1997).
128 See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 3, at 355-57.
129 Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d
600, 609–10 (6th Cir.2001)); see also Bell v. Burdon, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's
case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Spinelli v. City of New York, 579
F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that existing gun dealers have a property interest in their business license);
Richardson v. Town of Eastover, 922 F.2d 1152, 1157 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[A] state-issued license for the continued pursuit
of the licensee's livelihood, renewable periodically on the payment of a fee and revocable only for cause, creates
a property interest in the licensee.”); cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (applying procedural due process
principles to temporary suspension of physician’s license to practice medicine); Bundo v. City of Walled Lake, 395 Mich.
679, 693 (1976) (holding that the current holder of a liquor license has a property interest in it).
130 See, e.g., Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 995 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Nor have
plaintiffs a property right in a possible future license.”).
131 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982) (“The churches' power under the statute is standardless,
calling for no reasons, findings, or reasoned conclusions.”).
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businesses purveying sexually explicit speech (which involve official rather than private discretion) rely
on the First Amendment, though they are structurally similar to the other licensing veto cases.132
Once it has been determined that a protected liberty or property interest is at stake, the
question is whether sufficient procedural safeguards have been provided. Generally, the requirement
of a neutral decisionmaker is lacking in private-veto cases. When a law allows a private party to make
decisions that eliminate or restrict another private party’s property or liberty interest, without
standards or government oversight, it has likely exposed the party to a potential deprivation without
assuring a neutral decisionmaker. Indeed, in many of the private-veto cases, courts have noted the
danger of pecuniary or other illicit bias affecting the decisionmaker.133 These include many of the
occupational licensing cases discussed above.134 Other commentators discussing private delegations
have likewise noted that the financial interests of the delegate could undermine this aspect of due
process in certain cases.135
If the main problem with private vetoes is the lack of a neutral decisionmaker, however, then
the question arises whether a showing of bias, or likelihood of bias, must be made in order for the
veto scheme to be invalid. As the Supreme Court has explained, a plaintiff must show that “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker,” in the form of “a pecuniary
interest in the outcome” or some other reason to expect personal prejudice on the part of the
adjudicator, “is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”136 In cases of financial self-dealing, the Court
has generally required the showing of corruption to be fairly direct and overwhelming, as in the case
of a judge who received a supplemental payment for each fine imposed under a particular law,137 or
another judge who had received extraordinary amounts of campaign contributions from a company
shortly before adjudicating a case involving that company.138
Still, a showing of likely rather than actual bias is all that is required.139 This showing would
likely be satisfied where a private veto is given to a business licensee’s competitors, who have an
obvious interest in minimizing the competition. It would be less obvious in the case of adjoining
property owners given the power to block a particular land use, however.140 Moreover, nonpecuniary
bias or potential bias may be harder to identify, and it is rarely called out in cases that appear to raise
its prospect, such as those involving admitting privileges for abortion providers.141 Where the group
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226–27 (1990) (“Like a censorship system, a licensing scheme creates
the possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be suppressed where there are inadequate procedural safeguards
to ensure prompt issuance of the license.… Where the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license, the
risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion.”)
133 Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927))
(holding that a decisionmaker with a financial stake in the matter does not afford due process).
134 Supra Part I.A.2.
135 Lawrence, supra note 14, at 685 (“[T]he possibility of private interest is often inherent in the private delegation;
recognition of that interest may even have been the reason for the delegation.”); Volokh, supra note 11, at 940-41
(“[D]elegation of power plus pecuniary bias is a due process faux-pas, and it is easy to imagine (or presume) that such
bias will be more likely if the delegate is private.”)
136 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
137 Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
138 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-86 (2009).
139 Id. at 885 (“Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on the election under
all the circumstances ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.’” (quoting Tumey, supra, at 532)).
140 Of course, it is possible that those property owners could be acting on their own financial interests by rejecting uses
of property that they perceive as likely to reduce their own property values.
141 But see Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the political pressure from rightto-life groups surrounding the licensing of an abortion clinic).
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of potential decisionmakers is broader and more diffuse, moreover, the likelihood of individuals’
biases playing a role may be somewhat lessened. Thus, voter referenda over zoning decisions have
been upheld as constitutional;142 similarly, general licensing requirements, such as mandating
graduation from any ABA law school in order to practice law, have been found constitutionally
untroubling.143
Yet another procedural due process problem arises to the extent that a law affords no
procedural safeguards in connection with the deprivation of property or liberty. If the private veto
power is final, with no opportunity for official review of the decision, then in most cases the Mathews
v. Eldridge balancing test should favor the party challenging the veto, since the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest occurs without any process at all. This insight tracks what Alexander
Volokh calls the “mandatory-discretionary distinction,” whereby the private delegation is
unconstitutional only if the private veto is mandatory and coercive, rather than simply provoking
review by a court or other governmental body.144 Thus, as Volokh points out, in cases such as Roberge,
Fuentes v. Shevin, and Gibson v. Berryhill (in which a group of optometrists sat in final judgment over the
delicensing of competitor optometrists), no appeal would lie from the private veto.145 This is likely
necessary for the private veto to be found unconstitutional. On the other hand, in some cases, such
as New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orr W. Fox Co., the grant of authority to a private group of
car manufacturers to require review by the state New Motor Vehicle Board before an entity could
“terminate, open, or relocate a dealership” was not unconstitutional, because the private group did
not make a final determination—a state agency did.146 Similarly, the abortion clinic’s challenge to the
requirement of a transfer agreement with a hospital failed in Baird because the state offered a waiver
process, guided by clearly stated substantive standards, for clinics that were unable to meet the
requirement.147
One final point is needed to clarify the procedural due process analysis. Unlike with other
private delegations, and contrary to the concerns raised by some commentators,148 there is no difficulty
in identifying state action when the government grants a private veto of this kind, regardless of
whether the private delegate is considered a state actor. The law or regulation that provides dominion
over a person’s property or liberty without standards or safeguards is the driving force behind the
deprivation of due process. The government has violated due process when it fails to provide a neutral

City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1976) (distinguishing referenda over individual
zoning changes from cases like Eubank and Roberge, in which a more limited group of people exercised a veto over
another person’s property).
143 E.g., In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1978).
144 Volokh, supra note 11, at 944-50.
145 Id. (“In all of these cases, the due process problem was that they were able to force an alteration in the legal regime
without any discretion remaining in government and without any protection against their personal biases.”)
146 Id.; New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 105 (1978).
147 Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 610 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Health Director’s “ability to
grant a waiver of this requirement means that the area hospitals do not necessarily have the final veto on whether an
abortion clinic is licensed”). Kenneth Culp Davis has argued that procedural safeguards and administrative standards are
more important than statutory standards for ensuring that a delegation meets the requirements of procedural due
process. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 713 (1969). Of course, standards are
still necessary; judicial or administrative review is meaningful only if there are known and sufficiently definite standards
to be applied in that review.
148 See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 101, at 203-08; Metzger, supra note 15, at 1411-21.
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decisionmaker or fair procedures; the challenger does not have to point to specific acts of the delegate
to prove a due process violation.149
To summarize, then, a private veto granted by state law will violate the procedural due process
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments150 if it grants standardless and unreviewable
power over the constitutionally protected property or liberty of another to a person, group, or entity
that is likely to exhibit financial or other forms of bias. However, if pre-deprivation official review of
the private veto is available and guided by determinate standards, the due process violation may
disappear.151
B. Substantive Due Process
1. Framework for analysis
Private vetoes may also violate principles of substantive due process. While substantive due
process is a somewhat protean doctrine, one basic and longstanding principle is that it protects
individuals against arbitrary government action. Substantive due process can be distinguished from
procedural due process in that it may bar certain deprivations “regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.”152 When the government seeks to deprive a person of a
constitutionally recognized fundamental liberty interest, the Due Process Clause generally requires a
heightened form of scrutiny of the purpose served by the deprivation and the means used to advance
that purpose.153 Yet, even where a fundamental liberty interest is not implicated, substantive due
process doctrine still prohibits subjecting persons to arbitrary government action.154 Indeed, an
arbitrary law by definition lacks a rational basis, and therefore fails even the lowest tier of scrutiny
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Thus, a substantive due process challenge to a
law affording a private veto should proceed fairly straightforwardly: the court would ask simply
whether the law grants standardless discretion over a person’s actual or potential property or liberty
interest to a third party.

Thus, the challenger need only name as a defendant the state official who has the duty to enforce the delegate’s
decision—such as the director of the health department in Baird (who denies the abortion clinic’s license based on the
failure to secure an agreement with a hospital) or the municipal liquor commission in Grendel’s Den. Alternately, the
constitutional claim could presumably be enforced in the context of a civil suit between two private parties. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
150 Of course, the same analysis would apply with respect to federal action under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause as to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
151 Whether the official review process is sufficient and whether it must be available before or after the deprivation
occurs are questions to be determined through application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.
152 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
153 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 120, at § 15.7.
154 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235,
244 (1819)); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889); and Parratt v.
Taylor, 541 U.S. 527, 549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result)); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government
Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 314 (1991)
(“[E]ven where fundamental rights are not implicated the due process clause substantively protects
against arbitrary government action.”). Paul Larkin locates this longstanding prohibition on arbitrary government action
in the private delegation context to the Magna Carta (which is also referenced by the Supreme Court in Daniels). Larkin,
supra note 3, at 354-57; cf. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J.
1672, 1677, 1681 (2012) (arguing that procedural due process protects against arbitrary decision-making, in the sense of
decision-making that is not in accordance with legal standards, and that this protection is derived from the Magna
Charta).
149

24

Unfortunately, confusion clouds the application of this strand of substantive due process
doctrine, particularly in the lower federal courts.155 Some courts have insisted that a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest be affected for even the substantive due process protection to
apply. As numerous scholars have demonstrated, however, this cannot be the correct understanding
of the doctrine.156 All, or nearly all, government regulation affects individual “liberty.” Where the
liberty affected is a fundamental one, a higher level of scrutiny applies; there is still, however, a baseline
rationality and non-arbitrariness requirement for all government action, even when ordinary economic
and social liberties are affected.157 Thus, while private veto laws will generally grant arbitrary authority
over another’s liberty or property in a generic sense, it is not necessary to demonstrate that such an
interest is an established one in order to state a substantive due process claim.
Yet, lest the doctrine become unwieldy, it is important to recognize that this insight does not
entail that all private delegations of veto power are inherently arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.
First, as noted above, the delegation must be both lacking standards and lacking an opportunity for
official review that is itself guided by standards.158 Thus, in the cases involving prejudgment seizure
and occupational licensing, the private delegations have generally been found unconstitutional
because, even if there is some level of involvement by a public official in the process, the private
delegates possess ultimate authority. The public official is powerless to deny the seizure or grant the
license when a private hospital has denied admitting privileges or when a private individual has sworn
out the required affidavit.159 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit upheld the private delegation in Baird
precisely because the possibility remained that a public official, applying defined standards and subject
to judicial review, could waive the requirement of private approval.160 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
rejected an unconstitutional-delegation challenge to an Arizona law that made abortion clinics’ licenses
dependent on the ability of their physicians to secure admitting privileges at an Arizona hospital
because hospitals were forbidden by Arizona law to deny those privileges arbitrarily.161 The presence
of legally enforceable and reviewable standards for the private delegate’s exercise of power thus defeats
a substantive due process claim grounded in the arbitrariness of the delegation, both because such
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note __, at 346-47 & nn. 178-86.
Levinson, supra note __, at 348 (“[T]hose courts which have required initial identification of a fundamental right to
trigger substantive due process have confused the concept that substantive due process protects certain nontextual
interests from government interference absent compelling justification with the generic doctrine that substantive due
process shields individuals from arbitrary, capricious government misconduct. …[T]he basic principle that substantive
due process may be used to protect against fundamentally unfair government action remains intact.”); see generally Jeffrey
D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the
Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491 (2011).
157 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1955).
cf. Larkin, supra note 3, at 360 (arguing that a requirement of nonarbitrariness, derived from the Magna Carta, is a central
principle of American law). Note, however, that some courts have found that “[t]he right to hold specific private
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference” is a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Bernard v. United Twp.
High Sch. Dist. No. 30, 5 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1993).
158 See supra __.
159 See supra __.
160 Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 599, 610 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the law allowed a waiver by
the director of the Ohio Department of Health if “the director determines that the strict application of the license
requirement would cause an undue hardship to the [health care facility] and that granting the waiver would not
jeopardize the health and safety of any patient” (quoting Ohio Admin. Code § 3701–83–14(B)(2)) (alteration in original)
and holding that this waiver option was fatal to the plaintiffs’ delegation claim).
161 Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Arizona law requires hospitals to refrain from
arbitrary provision of admitting privileges and requires them to exercise their discretion based on reasons related to the
hospital's interests.”).
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standards mean that the private entity’s power may not be exercised arbitrarily and, similarly, because
it ensures that the government is not granting to a private entity a power that the government itself
could not exercise (i.e., the power to deny or withhold property or liberty arbitrarily).
In addition, it is important to keep in mind the narrow applicability of the private-veto
doctrine. The private-veto doctrine has application only where the power is exercised over particular
individuals or entities by other discrete individuals or entities. It thus applies only in contexts that
might be considered adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative and does not necessarily apply to broad
legislative or rulemaking powers. I say “not necessarily” here to indicate that such delegations are
simply not within the scope of the doctrine I am identifying as the “private-veto doctrine,” and not to
say that delegations of legislative or rulemaking powers are always or inherently unproblematic from
a constitutional perspective. When the creation of legislative rules is delegated to a private group, the
concern often arises that that group will act to benefit itself, since the members of that group usually
form part of the regulated entity. For example, in Carter Coal, a subset of coal producers and laborers
were empowered to set rules that bound others—but those rules would also bind the privileged subset
making the rules.162 While I do not take the position that this scenario is perfectly untroubling, it is
less troubling from a constitutional perspective when a group sets rules that the group itself must also
obey. Indeed, as Justice Jackson long ago explained:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.163
The private-veto doctrine is concerned with scenarios in which private entities exercise dominion over
the particular property or liberty interests of another. This adjudicative-rulemaking distinction explains
why the delegations challenged in cases such as Currin v. Wallace164 and United States v. Rock Royal CoOp165 were not struck down under the private-veto doctrine. Indeed, even public referenda over
individual zoning decisions are constitutional—although they arguably involve the exercise of adjudicative
rather than legislative powers—because they do not delegate the decision to a discrete, identifiable
delegate or group of private delegates, but rather to the people as a whole, and by definition involve
the affected parties in the decision-making.166
2. Differentiating Substantive Due Process Claims from Procedural Due Process Claims

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (noting that “[t]he power conferred upon the majority is, in effect,
the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.”).
163 Ry. Exp. Agency v. People of State of N.Y., 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
164 306 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1939).
165 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (upholding the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt rules promulgated by
private milk producers).
166 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (“[T]he standardless delegation of power to a
limited group of property owners condemned by the Court in Eubank and Roberge is not to be equated with
decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process.”); cf. Jaffe, supra note 100, at 248 (noting the possibility
that the constitutionality of a private delegation depends on “the existence of a standard upon which judicial control may
be premised, except in situations where all the persons to be affected take part, as in the local option cases”). Admittedly,
the decision in Eastlake is not entirely easy to justify, given that the overwhelming majority of those making the zoning
decision are unaffected by it.
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Some cases discussed in this Article can only be understood as substantive due process cases
because the plaintiffs lacked an established property or liberty interest. To the extent that it raises
delegation issues separate from the Establishment Clause issues, Grendel’s Den could only involve a
nondelegation claim based on the arbitrary nature of the private veto for example, since the bar had
not yet received a liquor license.167 The Grendel’s Den case thus stands in contrast to Yick Wo, in which
Chinese laundry operators stood to lose long-established businesses.168 Yet, it is reasonable to ask
whether the procedural due process approach—which includes the requirement of a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest—adds anything to the analysis. It seems that all private vetoes
that violate procedural due process would also violate substantive due process due to their inherent
arbitrariness, so there is no need for a procedural due process claim at all.
There are several responses to this concern. First, as noted above, one goal of this Article is
to provide analytical clarity around the private-veto doctrine and its constitutional grounding. This
Article has demonstrated that the doctrine is longstanding, implicating both procedural and
substantive due process insofar as it prevents arbitrary governmental deprivations of property and
liberty. This analysis remedies a degree of uncertainty in the scholarly literature discussing private
delegation.169 Second, given the evident confusion and discomfort of courts in applying substantive
due process analysis to protect against arbitrary government action, it must be acknowledged that the
procedural due process line of cases is somewhat more firmly rooted. Thus, another implication of
this Article’s analysis is that the protection against private vetoes is particularly powerful where an
established, constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is involved. This is especially true
because, as noted below, the standard for arbitrariness under a substantive due process analysis may
be particularly difficult to meet. Litigants who can claim a procedural due process violation should
therefore be particularly inclined to do so.170
Third and perhaps most importantly, it is possible that substantive due process challenges to
private vetoes require a higher showing of arbitrariness than procedural due process challenges. When
a party claims that a private veto is being exercised over its constitutionally protected property or
liberty interest, the violation arises from the fact that the deprivation of property or liberty occurs
without notice or a hearing, and it usually effected by a self-interested rather neutral decisionmaker.
Thus, the arbitrariness of the decision itself is not the focus of the analysis. When a substantive due
process claim is raised, however, the claimant must show that the deprivation lacks a rational basis,
and this requirement is generally understood to be a difficult one to meet.171 Moreover, the facts of
the cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down a private veto often raise an inference that the
private veto was driven or potentially driven by an illicit motive, such as irrational prejudice, financial
self-interest, or a desire to advance the private delegate’s religious interests. It is therefore possible that
courts will be most likely to find a substantive due process violation only when a similar inference of

Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Mass. 1980).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
169 See supra note 118.
170 It is possible, however, that the remedy for a procedural due process violation is simply to provide access to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker before the deprivation of property or liberty and not a
per se invalidation of the deprivation.
171 See, e.g., Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1221 & n.61 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that an administrative
action will not violate substantive due process except if it lacks rational basis or is entirely “willful and unreasoning” and
citing cases); Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing FCC v.
Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993), and Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364
(1973)).
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improper motive (such as a private religious motivation, discriminatory bias, or personal animus) may
be made.172
C. State Action
The mix of private and public actors in private-veto cases may appear to raise the question
whether, and how, state action is actually at issue. Of course, it is important to locate state action in
private-veto cases, because the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees of due process are binding only against
the government and not against private individuals.173 The exercise of private power generally does
not raise constitutional concerns, however arbitrary or otherwise troubling that exercise may be.174
The difficulty of this question is largely illusory, however. There is no question that the
government acts when, through legislation or regulation, it provides standardless authority to a private
party. It is the government’s grant of authority, moreover, that is the source of the due process
violation. By designating a private party as the arbiter of another person’s liberty or property interests,
without guidelines for the exercise of authority, and by abdicating authority to substantively review
the private sovereign’s decision, the government has authorized a deprivation of property or liberty
without an opportunity for review by a neutral decision-maker.175 In addition, it has not just ratified,
but instead has created the conditions for. a substantively arbitrary deprivation of that constitutionally
protected interest.176
When a protected property interest is involved, as explained above, the analysis is fairly
straightforward: the key question is likely whether state law creates an entitlement to the property
(such as by recognizing a reasonable expectation in the continuation of an existing business license).177
The early private-veto cases all seemed to involve a constitutionally-protected liberty interest of this
sort.178 In order to make out a due-process violation, the plaintiff would then only need to show the
lack of neutral decision-maker or a lack of standards and judicial review over the deprivation arising
from the state’s delegation of power to a private authority.179 In the alternative, the plaintiff can make

In the context of “class-of-one” equal protection claims—which bear a resemblance to private-veto claims in that
they challenge small-scale arbitrary government actions, often involving individual property interests—one Supreme
Court case has raised the possibility that a showing of malice or ill-will on the part of the decisionmaker is required. See
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 566 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the lower court had found
the challenged decision was motivated by “vindictive action,” “illegitimate animus,” or “ill will”); Alex M. Hagen, Mixed
Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Discourse, and Judicial Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L.
REV. 197, 206 (2013) (stating that several circuits have required a showing of evil motive for class-of-one equal
protection claims).
173 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment.”); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 621 (2000).
174 Id.
175 Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-26 (1991) (holding that private parties may not use racebased peremptory challenges in civil litigation and emphasizing that, although the challenge might be exercised by a
private party, the government delegated coercive authority to the private party).
176 It may be a separate question whether there is a governmental official charged with overseeing and enforcing the
delegate’s decision who may be sued and enjoined from enforcement. If there is no such official, then it is possible the
claim of unconstitutional private veto may only be raised defensively in a civil suit between private parties.
177 Supra Part II.A.
178 Supra text accompanying notes 18-38.
179 Supra Part II.A.
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out a substantive due process claim by showing that the private delegate’s decision was substantively
arbitrary, religiously motivated, or motivated by illicit bias.180
A somewhat trickier state-action question arises, however, when an individual claims a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In this case, it would seem that state action
is required in two separate parts of the analysis. First, state action must be shown in the delegation—
a showing which, as noted above, is easy enough to make when the delegation is prescribed by a statute
or regulation. This is the state action necessary for the procedural or substantive due process violation.
But does the plaintiff also need to make a separate showing of state action in connection with the
underlying liberty interest? In other words, if a plaintiff is claiming that the government has granted a
private party a veto over her reproductive liberty by authorizing that person to decide whether she can
access abortion, does the claim fail because she has no right to access abortion as against that private
party?
It is not possible to answer this question with absolute certainty, but the better answer seems
to be that no separate showing of state action is required. Some cases in analogous contexts have
seemingly reached a contrary conclusion. For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation where a custodial parent arguably exercised a
private veto over a child’s constitutional rights to bodily integrity—an aspect of the constitutional
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.181 The parent had severely beaten the child after
the state refused to remove the child, despite multiple reports of child abuse by concerned individuals
and government employees.182 In fact, the Court found that no constitutional liberty interest was
involved in the case at all, reasoning that the point of the Due Process Clause is to “protect the people
from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.”183 Yet DeShaney could
be read to make a different point. Indeed, the Court explicitly noted that the claimed violation of the
child’s right to bodily integrity—the state’s failure to protect him from harm at the hands of his
father—could not exist against the father, because it did not even exist against the state: there is simply
no due-process right to the protection of the state.184 Interestingly, the Court then cited Yick Wo for
the proposition that the state could not deny that protection selectively to a particular group of people,
suggesting that the lack of state action was not the problem.185 Moreover, in another case that is
perhaps more directly on point, the Court has found that a minor’s right to reproductive autonomy
may be infringed by granting a private veto over a patient’s abortion decision to the patient’s parent
or spouse. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court rejected a state’s effort to
require spousal consent for abortion, finding that this grant of “veto power exercisable for any reason
whatsoever or for no reason at all” violated the patient’s reproductive autonomy; nor could the state
grant parents an “absolute, and possibly arbitrary veto” over their pregnant child’s abortion decision.186
Supra Part II.B.
489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
182 Id. at 192-93.
183 Id. at 196.
184 Id. at 196-97 (“If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular
protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been
averted had it chosen to provide them.”). In addition, it is not entirely surprising that the Court did not see the state’s
refusal to remove the child from an abusive parent’s custody as a delegation of state authority over the child’s bodily
integrity. The questions of whether state action exists when the state authorizes parents to make certain decisions on
behalf of their children and of whether children have a right to bodily integrity against their parents are enormously
complex, and the law does not offer clear guidance. See generally B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children's Bodily Integrity,
64 DUKE L.J. 1295 (2015).
185 Id. at 197 n.3.
186 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
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Indeed, the Court insisted that the state could not “delegate” to a private party “a power [the state]
itself could not exercise.”187 Danforth thus implies that the relevant question, in determining whether a
constitutional liberty is implicated in a private veto scenario, is whether the government, if standing
in the shoes of the private party, would be violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
III.

Implications

As Louis Jaffe stated, delegation of sovereign power to a private group does more than allow
“the group to maintain a certain minimum position with respect to other groups”; it is “a demand for
group privileges over against the rest of society.”188 The private-veto doctrine thus addresses equalcitizenship concerns central to any democratic society committed to the rule of law. The private-veto
doctrine prevents the government from using private actors to implement biases on which the
government itself is forbidden to act, and it forbids private parties to exercise arbitrary sovereignty
over the property or liberty of others. In this way, it shields unpopular individuals or groups from
arbitrary mistreatment—at least when the government bears some responsibility for that
mistreatment. It also supports value pluralism by allowing individuals to act on their own personal
values and beliefs, but limiting their ability to adversely affect or burden others based on those beliefs.
One goal of this Article has been to demonstrate the continuing vitality of the private-veto
doctrine in American constitutional law. Although not generally recognized as a robust and vital
doctrine of constitutional law, it is hardly moribund; to the contrary, it has been woven into case law
touching on numerous areas of doctrine. Yet, there is still room for greater bolstering of the privateveto doctrine. Perhaps due to the perception that its contours are fuzzy or that it lacks currency, the
doctrine is likely not invoked as often as it could be. Thus, this Part considers two applications of the
private-veto doctrine that could be made further developed. In particular, this Part argues that the
doctrine should be robustly applied in the context of abortion clinic regulations that depend on private
parties and in the context of delegations that empower religiously motivated individuals or
organizations to exercise authority over third parties. In both cases, courts can and should enforce the
prohibition on private vetoes.
A.

Abortion Clinic Regulations

As explained above, the private veto doctrine has been invoked and occasionally enforced in
the context of abortion clinic regulations. In particular, as discussed above, courts have sometimes
held that laws making an abortion clinic’s license depend on the clinic’s ability to secure an agreement
with a hospital, or on its physicians’ ability to secure admitting privileges at a hospital, constitute an
187
188
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Jaffe, supra note 100, at 202. Here is the entire quote:
Becoming more explicitly self-interested and bolder in its extremity, each group demands the aid of
government. What is asked is power of self-government and power for the group to maintain a
certain minimum position with respect to other groups. These demands are, of course, but one aspect
of the incessant pressure upon government to supply that co-ordination of economic forces which
our traditional structure has failed to provide. This general phenomenon has been continually
observed and is well known to the reader. In its sum total it is more than the demand of any one
group; the regulation of the railroads, for example, expresses a merger of many interests. But here, we
are examining one of the significant forms in which these demands are pressed; it is in part a demand
for group privileges over against the rest of society; in part a demand by the more explicit elements in
a group that the group as a corporate body be given power to coerce under the sanction of law
dissentient members of the group.
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unconstitutional private delegation.189 Indeed, even after the Supreme Court twice struck down
admitting-privileges requirements for abortion providers, states have found ways to subject abortion
clinics’ licenses to the whims of private actors such as hospitals.190
Yet, some courts and litigants have also shied away from applying the private-veto
nondelegation doctrine in this context.191 One possible reason for the reluctance to apply the privateveto doctrine is that it appears difficult to delimit; it may seem to apply in too many situations and to
strike down too many different kinds of regulations. However, this Article argues that, properly
understood, the private-veto doctrine is a manageable and limited doctrine that may provide a useful
means of challenging some arbitrary and medically unnecessary abortion clinic regulations.
The concern about the overly expansive nature of the private-delegation doctrine may be seen
in the numerous forms of regulation to which abortion clinics (and other medical facilities) are subject.
For example, abortion clinics may be required to have certain licensed professionals on staff, such as
nurses, nurse anesthetists, and physicians.192 Because those professional licenses require certain
credentials—such as a degree from an accredited school—they arguably delegate to private parties
(nursing schools, accrediting bodies) control over the liberty of others to practice their occupation and
the clinic’s property interest in its license. Yet, it borders on the absurd to suggest that any requirement
that a licensed health care facility employ certain licensed personnel risks invalidation as a private veto.
And indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the performance of abortions may be limited
to certain licensed health care personnel and licensed facilities.193
To answer this concern, it is important to recall the limitations on the private-veto doctrine
described above. First, to be unconstitutional, the delegation must be standardless, with no
opportunity for official review of whether the delegate has properly applied those standards. When
certain credentials are required for the entry into a particular profession, including accreditation, the
credentialing body usually applies clearly delineated, well-publicized standards.194 Negative
accreditation decisions are often subject to a review process by the accrediting body and a route for
obtaining pre-deprivation judicial review is usually prescribed.195 Thus, in cases where they have been
found constitutional, private delegations generally could not fairly be described as both mandatory (or
final) and standardless.196 By contrast, when abortion clinics have challenged the requirement of
See supra Part I.A.2.
June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020); Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582
(2016), as revised (June 27, 2016).
191 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Ohio Admin. Code § 3701-83-18.
193 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to
the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of
less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.”)
194 For example, the American Bar Association provides extensive guidance and extremely detailed requirements from
accreditation of law schools. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 20212022, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/standards/2021-2022/2021-2022-aba-standards-and-rules-of-procedure.pdf.
195 For example, if a law school is denied accreditation, it can appeal this decision. Id. at 70-74. In fact, access to an
appellate process is required by the U.S. Department of Education, which regulates such accrediting agencies. See U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Student Assistance General Provisions, The Secretary's Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, The
Secretary's Recognition Procedures for State Agencies, 84 Fed. Reg. 58834 (July 1, 2020). See also Natl. Assn. of Forensic
Counselors v. Fleming, 143 Ohio App.3d 811, 815-16 (2001) (upholding a delegation of authority to a private accrediting
agency in part because the private agency applied clear standards and review by a government official was available).
196 One could also point out that private law schools are themselves private actors to whom the government arguably
delegates the power to decide whether or not a particular individual can become a lawyer. Again, however, the large
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employing a physician with admitting privileges at a local hospital, courts have generally noted that
those hospitals can choose to deny those privileges for any reason, or no reason whatsoever.197 Indeed,
some courts have recognized that hospitals deny privileges for anticompetitive reasons.198
Second, the universe of private delegates usually must be relatively limited for the doctrine to
apply. As noted above, the problem with private vetoes is not that the delegation is too sprawling, but
that it is small-scale and intimate.199 The private-veto doctrine is in large part concerned with private
actors working in their own financial self-interest to hinder competitors, or acting on biases that the
government could not itself espouse. Such troubling motivations often entail a degree of familiarity
on the part of the delegate with the party affected by the delegation, as well as perhaps some form of
geographic or other proximity. Moreover, the decision of a private individual or group of individuals
can only function as a veto if there is no realistic way the private party can continue to operate without
the approval of a small number of individuals. If the private party can seek to fulfill the legal
requirement in a number of different ways and seek compliance through a large number of possible
private partners, the law seems less like a private veto (or like a veto at all). Thus, while the requirement
of having a licensed physician working with the clinic may seem like a law granting a private veto to
both accrediting bodies and medical schools, it is important to recognize that there exists a large
number of medical schools and of licensed physicians. The clinic’s recourse is not limited to a small
number of individuals or schools. By contrast, there may be only a handful of hospitals that qualify as
“local” or within a reasonable driving distance of an abortion clinic. Geographic limitations on where
qualifying hospitals may be located may magnify this problem.200 The property rights at issue in Roberge
were subjected to the whims of a specific group of neighbors. Of course, line drawing can become an
issue with respect to this requirement, especially in terms of what constitutes a sufficiently identifiable
or small and discrete group. But such line-drawing is a task that courts are presumably competent to
perform—especially given that many cases will not present close questions.
Finally, it is important to recall that clinics with existing licenses will be on firmer doctrinal
ground than clinics seeking to apply for a new license. Although substantive due process doctrine
forbids private vetoes of either sort of licensing decision, courts may look for a higher showing of
arbitrariness or illicit motivation when the latter is involved. A clinic currently in possession of a license
can likely show that it has a state-created property interest in that license, however, and may therefore
more easily show that the standardless delegation to a private decision-maker violates the clinic’s right
to procedural due process.201
This doctrine may have other applications in the abortion context as well. For example,
Laurence Tribe and David Rosenberg have argued, in essence, that a Texas law allowing private
number and variety of law schools minimize concerns about individual biases or illicit motivations for exclusion, and the
law schools’ pecuniary interests cut in favor of admitting, rather than excluding, a given student.
197 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting “[t]he
absence of definite standards for the granting of admitting privileges”); June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp.
3d 473, 491 (M.D. La. 2016) (“There is no state or federal statute which governs the rules for the granting or denial of
hospital admitting privileges in Louisiana.”); id. at 533 (“[A] hospital can effectively deny a physician's application
without formally doing so and therefore affect a de facto denial without expressing the true reasons (or any reasons) for
doing so.”).
198 See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820 (3d Cir. 1984).
199 Supra text accompanying note 108.
200 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, No. 2:15-CV-04273-NKL, 2015 WL 9463198, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
Dec. 28, 2015) (requiring abortion clinics to have physicians with admitting privileges at a hospital within 15 minutes’
travel time from the clinic or an agreement with such a hospital for treating the clinics’ patients in an emergency).
201 Women's Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006).
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claimants to sue anyone who provides or assists with an abortion after six weeks of pregnancy may
violate the private veto principle described here, although they do not identify the private-veto
doctrine as such.202 Because the law allows enforcement of its provisions by private lawsuits, Tribe
and Rosenberg argue that the law “delegates quintessentially governmental power to private parties
— in Texas, to literally anyone on earth with an objection to abortion, giving that individual or
organization the unilateral and unfettered power to” punish individuals for assisting in patients’
exercise of their constitutional abortion rights.203 Indeed, analogizing specifically to Grendel’s Den, Tribe
and Rosenberg note it is likely that private plaintiffs may be motivated primarily by religious scruples
in using this private veto power.204 Indeed, the application of the private veto doctrine in the particular
case of S.B. 8 clearly implicates the constitutional rights of the person subject to the veto—not
“just…serving liquor” as in Grendel’s Den—and thus may be on even stronger ground. On the other
hand, it is a problematic example insofar as it suggests than nearly any law creating a civil suit
enforcement mechanism could violate the private-veto doctrine. Numerous laws enable private parties
to sue other private parties for their enforcement; they should not be considered unconstitutional
unless they delegate standardless, unreviewable authority to a small number of individuals.
This approach to challenging abortion restrictions may continue to prove useful to advocates.
Most notably, it does not depend on the protean “undue burden” standard announced in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, which defines when a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to access
abortion.205 Instead, it relies on longstanding, trans-substantive principles of constitutional law that
protect private property and liberty interests. Thus, if the U.S. Supreme Court replaces the Casey
standard with a standard that is less protective of abortion rights,206 the private-veto doctrine may
become a particularly useful means of challenging certain kinds of abortion restrictions, such as
admitting privileges and written transfer agreement requirements.
Of course, if the Supreme Court eliminates the constitutional right to abortion entirely and a
particular state criminalizes abortion entirely, the private-veto doctrine will be of little use: an abortion
provider cannot claim a liberty or property interest in something that is illegal under state law. But in
many states, abortion may remain legal to some extent, and practitioners acting within the law will be
able to invoke the doctrine. Indeed, the nondelegation doctrine is arguably more well-established in
state courts and under state constitutions than in federal constitutional jurisprudence; it may therefore
provide a particularly useful tool for challenging abortion restrictions in state courts if control over
abortion policy is transferred to the states.207
B.

Religious Sovereignty
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Another realm in which the private-veto doctrine may apply—though scholars and courts
have not yet widely recognized it—is in cases where an entity or individual acting on a religious
motivation exercises authority over the liberty or property interest of another. In the case law and
scholarship discussing religious liberty, this subject is discussed in terms of “religious exemptions” or
“religious accommodations.”208 Religious exemptions or accommodations are laws, regulations, or
court rulings that grant individuals or organizations exemptions from laws that apply to the public
generally, but that violate the religious tenets of the individual or organization seeking the
exemption.209
Such accommodations are sometimes challenged on the ground that they violate the
Establishment Clause, on the theory that they cross the line from accommodating religious exercise
to actually providing valuable governmental support to religion, while harming or disadvantaging
nonreligious third parties.210 In the scholarly literature, the concern about harming nonreligious parties
in order to facilitate or accommodate religious exercise is often referred to as a concern about “thirdparty harms.”211 The notion that the Constitution prohibits religious accommodations that excessively
burden third parties seems to share relatively widespread acceptance in theory.212 In practice, however,
numerous conceptual puzzles have clouded its application, and the Supreme Court has not adopted a
robust version of this principle.213
Yet, at least some third-party harm scenarios may be reconceptualized as involving a private
veto. For example, religious exemptions to the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) contraceptive mandate
may be best understood as private vetoes, rather than as examples of third-party harms. The ACA’s
contraceptive mandate requires employers who provide health insurance to their employees to include
coverage for prescription contraceptives.214 The scope of the administratively created religious
exemption to this requirement for religious employers has changed a number of times.215 While
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lawsuits were pending over the scope of the Obama Administration’s exemption, which religious
employers saw as too narrow, the Trump Administration adopted a new regulation that broadly
licensed employers with any religious or even “moral” qualms to opt out of providing coverage to
their employees, without any concomitant requirement that employees be able to access that coverage
through other means.216 Although the Supreme Court upheld this regulation against a challenge under
the Administrative Procedure Act in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, it did not consider the privateveto problem.217 Arguably, however, the Trump regulation violates the private-veto doctrine and is
therefore unconstitutional. It delegates to private parties (employers) the authority to control their
employees’ access to a statutorily-guaranteed benefit based on the employer’s own religious beliefs—
not unlike the private veto granted to churches in Grendel’s Den. Moreover, while is unlikely that any
court would find a constitutionally protected liberty right to access government-funded contraception,
plaintiffs would be on firm footing in arguing that the ACA creates a statutory entitlement to—and
thus a governmentally created property interest in—particular health benefits.218 And since the privateveto doctrine is grounded in the Constitution, it would trump any claims for the exemption arising
under a statute such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The constitutional bar on third parties exercising religiously motivated veto power over
another’s access to health care guaranteed by statute would bring into question the constitutionality
of other religious opt-out laws as well. For instance, Section 1557 of the ACA arguably grants
individuals an enforceable entitlement to nondiscriminatory access to health care in facilities that
receive federal funds.219 The Trump Administration’s rule granting a broad religious exemption to this
nondiscrimination requirement with respect to health care services on the basis of sex (which has been
interpreted to include transgender status) has been challenged on the basis that it violates the
Establishment Clause due to the third-party burdens it imposes.220 Arguably, however, the privateveto doctrine is again a better way of explaining what is constitutionally problematic about that rule.
This religious exemption, like the contraceptive coverage exemption, grants a broad private veto
power that individuals may exercise over others’ statutorily guaranteed health care, based on their
private religious beliefs.221 And as cases such as Grendel’s Den illustrate, this religious motivation
qualifies as an arbitrary or illicit one, insofar as it is a motivation that government officials could not
rely upon in depriving private individuals of their liberty or property. For this reason, the government
cannot provide that authority to private delegates.
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Some states have similarly problematic exemption laws. For example, Ohio’s health-care
“conscience” law broadly empowers numerous individuals—including clinicians, pharmacists,
laboratory technicians, and even insurance companies—to decline to provide or pay for any health
care service on moral or religious grounds, regardless of whether the patient can access the service
elsewhere.222 If any of those services is protected by a statutory entitlement—such as the ACA—then
those state laws should be struck down, much like the Trump Administration rule, under the privateveto doctrine.
These examples also bear similarities to the case of Kim Davis, a Kentucky clerk of courts
who, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriage, not only personally refused
to approve marriage licenses for any couples, but also attempted to prevent any other employee of the
clerk’s office that she oversaw from doing so.223 Davis claimed that she had a religious right to opt her
entire county office out of providing marriage licenses at all, because her name would appear on the
licenses and thus imply her personal “endorsement” of the marriages.224 When her actions were
challenged by same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses in Davis’s county, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Davis’s actions violated their fundamental right to marry.225 Indeed, the court
held that Davis’s actions deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional right even though they had the
option to travel to another county to obtain marriage licenses; the constitutional violation was
complete when the clerk’s office denied the license based on Davis’s personal religious convictions.226
As the concurring opinion explained, Davis’s actions would fail even rational-basis scrutiny because
Davis’s morality-based objection does not constitute a “‘legitimate state interest’ justifying interference
with homosexual relationships.”227
Davis’s case could also be seen as raising concerns similar to those addressed by the privateveto doctrine, however. Of course, Davis was acting as a government official, not a private citizen, in
denying the licenses. But as in Yick Wo, the concern at the heart of the private-veto doctrine—
subjecting constitutional and property rights to the arbitrary whims of an individual or group of
individuals—is present whether the person exercising the veto is acting in an official or private
capacity. Thus, the private-veto doctrine is applicable to arbitrary, government-enabled
decisionmaking over others’ property or liberty, regardless whether the actual decisionmaker is a
government official or private party.
Finally, in the 2021 Supreme Court case Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Catholic Social Services
(CSS)—a Catholic social service agency that placed children with adoptive parents—exercised a
private veto over the right of same-sex couples to adopt. CSS had sought an exemption from
Philadelphia’s prohibition on discrimination against gay and lesbian couples by agencies providing
adoption services under a contract with the city.228 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the
Catholic organization was entitled to an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
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Amendment, in large part because the City’s rules regarding adoption placements allowed for other,
nonreligious exemptions from the nondiscrimination requirement.229
But in authorizing Catholic Social Services to deny certification as adoptive parents to samesex couples based on the agency’s religious commitments, the Court’s ruling granted Catholic Social
Services a private veto over the ability of same-sex couples to adopt. A motive that must be considered
“arbitrary” in a legal sense—the agency’s private religious beliefs—unquestionably played a role in the
adoption agency’s decision-making. It appears, then, that the grant of an exemption by the city might
have violated the couples’ due process rights under the private-veto doctrine (assuming, at least, they
could prove that state law grants an entitlement to parents who meet particular qualifications to adopt).
Yet, this scenario poses a particularly thorny problem for the private-veto doctrine, since the Court
held that CSS had an opposing constitutional right to that precise exemption. It sets up a potential
direct conflict between the right of religious individuals and organizations to an exemption from
generally applicable laws that violate their beliefs, and the right of individuals not to have the
government empower private parties to act on their own biases, including religious beliefs, when they
are wielding governmental authority.
One last point: the ability to identify a discrete private actor or group of private actors to
whom the power over the plaintiff’s liberty and property interests remains key in the private-veto
cases. In some of the examples above, the plaintiffs were beholden to a relatively limited number of
private individuals who were empowered to exercise sovereignty over the plaintiffs’ liberty or property.
For example, people generally have limited health insurance options, whether through one’s employer
or through public insurance. Hospital consolidation, too, has meant that people in many geographic
locales have few if any providers of surgical services to choose from.230 This situation contrasts with
other scenarios in which there is a much larger or unlimited number of service providers. For example,
in the case of Kim Davis, the plaintiffs in that case could have traveled to one of Kentucky’s other
119 counties to seek marriage licenses. Because the court found that the denial of a marriage license
by a government official constituted a per se violation of the fundamental right to marry, it concluded
that the availability of other venues for the exercise of the right did not undermine the plaintiffs’ claim.
If the claim were framed as a private-veto claim, however, it might be necessary to consider the
availability of marriage licenses in other counties. Similarly, there may be an argument that there was
no private veto power exercised against the same-sex couples in Fulton, because there were numerous
other providers of adoption services. While fact-intensive, the need to determine whether an
identifiable group of people is exercising the veto power is an important limiting principle for the
private-veto doctrine.

Conclusion
This Article unearths a long-standing and well-established but little-utilized doctrine of
constitutional law: the private-veto doctrine. With its emphasis on prohibiting private exercise of
sovereignty over other private individuals and its bar on arbitrary exercises of coercive power, the
private-veto doctrine resonates with some of the most fundamental values underlying the U.S.
constitutional order. Yet it has long been conflated with non-delegation line of cases and therefore
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treated as a moribund species of doctrine, which is both unmanageable and unmoored from any
recognizable line of modern constitutional jurisprudence.
The private-veto principle is not only deep-rooted—it is also entirely manageable and
rationalizable as a legal doctrine. Grounded in both substantive due process principles forbidding
arbitrary governmental decision-making and procedural due process principles requiring a predeprivation opportunity to be heard before a neutral decisionmaker for governmental deprivations of
liberty or property, the private-veto doctrine partakes of both established lines of jurisprudence.
Plaintiffs who can demonstrate that a legal rules deprives them (or threatens to deprive them) of
constitutionally protected liberty or privacy interests based on the arbitrary decision-making of a
private individual or entity, or group of private individuals or entities, can make out an infringement
of their due-process rights. A reconsideration of the private-veto doctrine thus provides a new avenue
for challenging particularly sticky problems of constitutional law. In particular, it sheds new light on
pressing contemporary issues in the contexts of abortion rights and religious freedom.
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